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I develop a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of
the European Union (EU) and use this model throughout the chapters of my
dissertation. The model incorporates some realistic features of the European
Union members. I calibrate the model and it matches the dvnamics of the
data well.
In the first chapter I study the need for fiscal policy cooperation be-
tween the new EU members (a small country) and the European Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) (a large country). I find that both countries
are better off when they do not cooperate their fiscal policies. This result
depends on the assumption about the presence of foreign ownership in the
smaller country. When there is no foreign ownership in the smaller country,
the large economy is indifferent between cooperating and not cooperating
but the smaller country still prefers not to cooperate its fiscal policy with
the EMU.
The new EU members are expected to join the monetary union. In
the second chapter I analyze the welfare consequences of different monetary
arrangements for the new EU members and investigate whether their partic-
ipation in the EMU is welfare-improving. Based on households' utility the
results show that a flexible exchange rate regime is preferred to a monetary
union and a monetary union is preferred to a fixed exchange rate regime.
In the third chapter I investigate whether there are welfare gains from
fiscal policy cooperation in the EMU. I assume that the EMU consists of
countries that are currently its members as well as the countries that will
join the EMU in the near future. I find that the incumbent EMU members
are better off under fiscal policy cooperation and the new members are as
well of under fiscal cooperation as they are in a non-cooperative equilibrium.
Under fiscal policy cooperation in my model, all policymakers have the same
objective by construction. Therefore, the results in my study differ from
some previous findings in the literature.
Chapter 1
Fiscal and Monetary Policy in the
Enlarged European tlnion
1.1 Introduction
In May 2004, the European Union (EU) enlarged once more and now includes two differ-
ent groups of countries.l Most of the incumbent EU members renounced their sovereign
monetary policies in favor of a single, supranational monetary policy and constitute the
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The second group are the new EU mem-
bers who are expected to join the monetary union once they have met the exchange rate
criterion and successfully participated in the Exchange Rate Mechanism IERUZ;.2 While
the EMU countries do not have national monetary policies available, the new EU members
are focusing on the exchange rate and cannot freely use monetary policies for stabilization
purposes. Therefore, fiscal policies have become increasingly more important stabilization
'Without loss of generality I concentrate on two groups of countries within the EU: the EMU countries
and the newly admitted Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). I do not differentiate among
countries within a group.
2They also have to satisfy other Maastricht criteria to be admitted to the monetary union.
tools in the EU.
At least two issues arise when considering how to conduct fiscal policies in the EU.
First, it is important that the EU governments avoid large budget deficits to be able to
facilitate stabilization policy and price stability. Second, national fiscal policies can cause
international spillovers since the EU countries are highly interdependent.3 The Maastricht
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact in particular were introduced to ensure prudent
fiscal policies of the EU member states. However, it remains an open question whether the
Stability and Growth Pact needs to be changed since many of the EU members have not
been adhering to its rules.4
In light of the above discussion, I ask the question whether it is desirable that the
EU governments cooperate on their fiscal policies. More specifically, I take into account
the environment of the enlarged EU and investigate whether fiscal cooperation between
the new EU members and the EMU countries is welfare-improving. The contribution of
my study is threefold. First, I develop a quantitative business cycle model which matches
the dynamics of Central and Eastern European countries and the Euro Area. I use this
model to analyze fiscal and monetary policy in the EU and provide an explanation about
the desirability of fiscal cooperation. Second, I incorporate a realistic assumption about
the presence of foreign ownership of the firms that has not yet been included in studies
of Central and Eastern European countries. Conclusions about desirability of fiscal policy
cooperation depend on this assumption.s Third, formal studies of the new EU countries
3See for example Giuliodori and Beetsma (forthcoming) who show some existence of fiscal spillovers and
thus potential room for fiscal cooperation in the EU.
aFor general discussion, see for example The Economist (2003, 2004). For a discussion tailored to the
new EU members, see Gerald et al. (2004).
sCEE countries rely heavily on foreign (mainly European) capital to finance catching up with the incum-
bent EU members. As a consequence, the presence of foreign ownership in new EU countries is substantial.
have focused on their monetary issues during the transition period to the EU but have
abstracted from fiscal policy.
In building the model, I follow Laxton and Pesenti (2003), Natalucci and Ravenna
(2003), Devereux (2002), Devereux and Lane (2004), Ghironi and Rebucci (2001), and Galf
and Monacelli (forthcoming). These are examples of two-country models where one country
is large and the other one is much smaller.G In my model, the large (foreign) economy
represents the EMU and the smaller (home) country represents the new EU members.
Each country has a fiscal and a monetary authority. The home central bank supports
a fixed exchange rate. The other three policymakers conduct stabilization policy by use
of policy rules and I assume that they can commit to the rules. Each government uses
government consumption as a fiscal instrument and adjusts the instrument in response to
its GDP movements. The foreign central bank follows a Taylor-type interest rate rule. When
governments cooperate on fiscal policies, each government chooses the response parameter
to its GDP to maximize the unconditional expectation of a weighted average of home and
foreign households' utility (welfare), taking the behavior of the foreign central bank as
given. The foreign central ba,nk chooses its response parameters to inflation and GDP to
maximize the unconditional expectation of foreign households' welfare, taking the behavior
of the governments as given. In a non-cooperative game, each player takes the actions of
the other two players as given and chooses response parameter(s) in its rule to maximize
the welfare of its own households. All players act simultaneously.
The foreign share in equity capitalization has ranged frorn 2O7o to 80% in many Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries during the period 1997-2003, while the share of CEE countries in equity capitalization in
incumbent EU members is negligible. See Table 1.2.
6The first three papers are tailored to Central and Eastern European countries. The structure of my
model resembles these models but includes some new elements that are necessary (fiscal policy) and appealing
(foreign ownership) when studying the need for fiscal cooperation in EU.
To understand how foreign ownership affects results, I first analyze a benchmark model
with no foreign ownership. When governments cooperate on their fiscal policies, they choose
response parameters to GDP to maximize a weighted average of home and foreign welfare
with the relative sizes of the economies as weights. The government of the large economy is
indifferent between cooperating and not cooperating on fiscal policy with the government
of the smaller economy. On the other hand, the government of the smaller country prefers
not to cooperate because under fiscal cooperation each government chooses the parameter
in its fiscal rule to stabilize shocks mainly in the large country.
Fiscal cooperation is even less desirable in the empirically more realistic model where
foreign households own home firms. In this case, home households no longer receive state-
contingent dividend income so their ability to insure themselves is reduced. Most of the
variables in the smaller country become more volatile (e.g. private consumption, GDP).
Therefore, both governments are more active in stabilizing the smaller economy when they
cooperate and this makes government purchases in both countries more volatile. More ag-
gressive fiscal policies have adverse effects on private non-tradable consumption in both
countries.T There is also a shift towards stabilizing shocks that affect both countries when
governments cooperate. Thus, the foreign non-tradable technology shock is not absorbed
as efficiently and introduces more volatility into foreign tradable consumption. As a conse-
quence, foreign overall private consumption is more volatile and welfare in the large econ-
omy is reduced. In the small country less volatile prices translate into less volatile tradable
private consumption so that overall private consumption is slightly less volatile when gov-
ernments cooperate. However, more volatility in labor supply and government purchases
TGonetnment purchases non-tradable goods.
dominate and home welfare is also lower under fiscal cooperation. Foreign central bank
cushions the negative effect of fiscal policies on private consumption but its actions are not
sufficient to make fiscal policy cooperation desirable.
My work relates to the literature on monetary and fiscal policy interactions and the
literature on optimal taxation which provide insights on whether there are gains from policy
cooperation or not. My model is similar to Quadrini (2004) in the sense that capital market
liberalization plays a role in the desirability of fiscal cooperation. In his model, equilibrium
with tax cooperation reproduces the outcome of the model without capital mobility which is
welfare-inferior to the case of capital market liberalization. His results crucially depend on
governments' inability to commit to future policies while I assume that policies can commit.
The inability of policymakers to commit is also the reason for counterproductive pol-
icy cooperation in Rogoff (1985), Kehoe (1989) and Canzoneri and Henderson (1991). If
policymakers could commit in their models, cooperation would be beneficial. Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1998), Beetsma et al. (2001) and Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002) show more
examples of counterproductive cooperation which is limited to a subset of players. They
consider a monetary union and decentralized fiscal policies and show how the adverse reac-
tion of a common central bank to fiscal cooperation can reduce welfare for some or all of
the players. However, cooperation is the preferred outcome if it is extended to all players.
Other contributions in the literature are Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003) and Eichen-
green and Ghironi (2002) who show that there is no need for fiscal cooperation in a monetary
union when all players agree on their goals. In this case they can reach their bliss points.
Jensen (1996) shows that fiscal cooperation may be disadvantageous if monetary coopera-
tion lacks credibility with the private sector but is welfare-improving when central banks
adhere to a rule. Lombardo and Sutherland (2003) conclude that fiscal cooperation may be
welfare.reducing if monetary policies are set non-cooperatively. Mendoza and Tesar (2003)
find gains from fiscal cooperation but the gains are very small.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a two-country model of
the European Union.
In Section 4I present
In section 3I describe the solution method and selection of parameters.
the transmission mechanism and dynamic
explain the results about fiscal cooperation is Section 5. Section
properties of the model. I
6 concludes.
L.2 A general equilibrium model of the European fJnion
L.z.L Overview of the economlc environment
To mimic the structure of the enlarged EU and in particular the nature of the newly
admitted members, I take into account some of the key features of these countries.8 One
of them is the presence of foreign ownership of the firms. Central and Eastern European
countries rely heavily on foreign (mainly European) capital to finance catching up with
the rest of the EU. As a consequence, the presence of foreign ownership in the new EU
countries is substantial. This feature is not present in other models on accession countries.
Second, intermediate goods represent a substantial part of imports of these countries. For
example, intermediate goods account for 60To of all Slovene imports and above 50% of
Czech and Hungarian imports, making them very exposed to external shocks.e Third,
sMany and even more of the countries' characteristics that
models of accession countries mentioned in the Introduction.
eMcCallum and Nelson (2000) show that intermediate goods
I use in my model are incorporated in the
as imports improve model dynamics.
domestic tradable goods are exported and consumed by domestic households. Fourth, non-
tradable sector is important and most of the government purchases are on non-tradable
goods. Taking all of the above into consideration provides more flexibility to match the data
and more realistic interdependencies between the Central and Eastern European countries
and the Euro Area.
The theoretical framework that I use for my analysis is a micro-founded dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium model. The foreign country in the model is designated to fit the
European Economic and Monetary Union and the home country represents an aggregate of
the new members of the EU. In each country there are households, firms, fiscal authority
(government) and monetary authority (central bank). Foreign variables are indexed by a
star.
Households in both countries are infinitely lived and have preferences over consumption,
real money balances, labor supply, and government purchases. Each household consumes
domestic final non-tradable goods, domestic final tradable goods and imported final trad-
able goods. Each household supplies homogenous labor to domestic firms producing final
non-tradable goods and to domestic firms producing intermediate tradable goods. Labor
is perfectly mobile between the sectors within a country. The labor market is perfectly
competitive and labor is immobile internationally. Households trade short-term nominal
bonds. There are two bonds, home and foreign, denominated in home and foreign currency,
respectively. Only the foreign denominated bond is traded internationally.
The ownership structure of the firms and the equity share trade is as follows: in all the
cases all but intermediate sector firms are locally-owned, i.e. home households own home
firms and foreign households own foreign firms. Since the presence of foreign ownership in
the new EU countries is substantial, I assume that owners of home and foreign intermediate
firms are foreign households who trade home and foreign equity shares and receive dividends
from home and foreign intermediate sector firms.lO
Each country produces three types of goods: final non-tradable goods, final tradable
goods and a continuum of differentiated intermediate tradable goods. The final non-tradable
goods are produced by perfectly competitive firms using domestic labor as input. Final
non-tradable goods can be consumed by households and by the government. The firms
which produce the final tradable goods operate in a perfectly competitive environment.
Their goods are produced by combining domestic and imported intermediate goods and
are used for private consumption. Each intermediate tradable good is produced by a single
firm in a monopolistically competitive environment. The input used in production of each
intermediate good is domestic labor. The intermediate goods are used in production of the
final tradable good. In the intermediate sector, there are nominal rigidities in the form of
a quadratic cost of price adjustment.
Government conducts stabilization fiscal policy. Government spending falls on the final
non-tradable good and is financed through tax revenues and seigniorage. The central bank
in each country is instrument independent of the government. Foreign central bank conducts
monetary policy by employing an interest rate rule and home central bank supports fixed
exchange rate.
loThe sector that is exclusively
not an extreme assumption about
foreign-owned is only one out of three sectors. This assumption is thus
the extent of foreign presence.
IL.2.2 Flouseholds and their trading opportunities
Utility function
Home consumer 7's utility function has the following form:
u{: Et l,o'
,i-0
-A7,,(1i,,.rl, (1 1)+$ 
l)
where labor supply equals Lt : LN,t I Lx,t, and labor is homogenous and perfectly mobile
between the sectors within the country, Ct is the consumption basket, P1 is consumption
price index, M1 are nominal money balances, and G1 are government purchases. o ) 0,
os>0,X20,d>0,{>0.Bisthediscountfactor,}istneelasticityofintertemporal
substitution of private consumption, fi is the elasticity of substitution of real money balances
and f, is labor supply elasticity. Ac,t is a preference shock and A7,,1is a shock to labor
disutility. Home consumers are indexed by j 
€ [0, a) and a is the relative size of the
home country. Foreign households' utility function is similar to the home one and foreign
households are indexed by j* e [a,1].
Intra-temporal allocation of consumption
Total consumption, Ci, is a composite index of non-tradable and tradable consumption
baskets, Ck,,, and Ctr,r, respectively:
t-
(r+,) *]
- 
p)n11Jtt1 : [,'
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where 0 1 gt ( 1 is the share of tradable consumption in the consumption basket and
p, > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between non-tradable and tradable consumption. The
(log of) tradable goods'weight, cpr, is subject to an autocorrelated disturbance term around
the steady state mean. This shock represents shifts in home residents' preferences from
non-tradable to tradable goods. C(, is a basket of final non-tradable goods produced by
perfectly competitive fi.rms.
Consumption index of tradable goods is defined as:
(1.2)
(1.3)4+ (ttr.,,) *]-. [rC*.r- l'i,L
n
r7-L
where 0 ( a,r ( 1is the share of home tradable consumption and q > 0 is the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign tradable good consumption. Cr, and Ct . ur.
baskets of home and foreign final tradable goods also produced by perfectly competitive
firms.
The definitions of consumption preferences imply:
Pr,t + (1 
- 
,) (Pr*,r)t-'l
where P1,' and P7 are the prices of non-tradable and tradable consumption baskets, respec-
: l'e''')'-'
1
r-rr
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tively, and Pp and PF" are the prices of home and foreign
respectively.
The demands for baskets C+ and Ck are:
baskets of final tradable goods,
:e,l+]-r ri,
ck,r: (1 
- Pt) [?] -' ,'r,
and the demands for home and foreign baskets of final tradable goods are:
c'r,r- alffil-' ,+,r,
(1 
-,) lE:] 
-'c+,,
Foreign households solve a similar problem.
Inter-temporal opt imization
The budget constraint for household 7 in the home country is:
Cfi,, (r.4)
(1.5)
(1 6)
(1.7)nj\-/ E-r* + 
-
! ju
Ml * B'r+, * etBil, * Pt+ ( +2 \ P1
s Ml-1 + (1 + ir)B{ * et(l + ,)B;'i + (r
+) '* ptcl+nr!P/
- 
r!) (w*, Lk,,*wx,rrk,r)
(1.8)
* PtTCrl .
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Home household j consumes , Cl, pays net lump-sum taxes, Tl , and receives wage income
net of labor income tax, (t-r!) (W*,rfk,r+Wx,tLr*,r). Household j holds domestic
money, Mi, and, home and foreign bonds, B and B*, denominated in home and foreign
currency, respectively, where Ai*, is the stock of home bonds held by household 7 entering
period t * 1 and Bil, is the stock of foreign bonds held by household j entering period
t + L. er is the nominal exchange rate in units of home currency per one unit of foreign
currency. The short-term nominal interest rates i; and ii are paid at the beginning of
period t and are known at time t 
- 
t. Only the foreign bond is traded internationally.
There are intermediation costs for households entering the international bond market.ll
In particular, households face convex cost of holding foreign bonds in quantities different
from the steady state level. The revenue from the intermediation is rebated to the home
consumers as a lump-sum transaction cost transfer, TCT|.12 In equilibrium, the rebate
equars rcr! : + (4L- +)'.\ Pt P )'
Each household chooses labor supply, bond and money holdings,
to maximize expected utility (1.1) subject to the budget constraint
conditions with respect to labor are:
and consumption path
(1.8) . The first order
(1.e)
where ruN,t z yff 
""a 
wx,t 
= ff ut" real wages in the final non-tradable sector and
intermediate sector, respectively. The first order conditions with respect to home and
rrThe intermediation costs are introduced to guarantee that net bond positions follow a stationary process
and economies converge asymptotically to a steady state. See Schmitt-Groh6 and Uribe (2003) on this and
other approaches on how to pin down the steday state values of bonds.
12I ass., e that intermediaries are perfectly competitive and owned by local households.
L2
t--
I
foreign bond holdings are:
/ .\-ol (trnil, aBti\, tr,*, pt ^_ (nj \-".|n",,lci) lt*(". t;= -? )l: p (r+rf*,) ,,lT#Ac,t,lrt*,) lL \ Tt ' /J
(1. 1 1)
This first order condition accounts for a reduced return on lending to foreigners and in-
creased cost of borrowing from foreigners due to the intermediation costs.
Unlike home households, foreign households trade only foreign bonds and they also
trade equity shares in home and foreign intermediate sector firms. Their budget constraint
is presented in the Appendix. The first order conditions with respect to home and foreign
shares are:
Ac,t (tl) -" 
- 
p(1 + ,it+t) E,l- P1 A
LPr- 
Ac't+r
Ab,r(tl.)-" :\Etl+ ((t - r?*J nfi, +vffr) o
v**
(tt*,)-"] j (1.10)
,F
c,t+1 (1.r2)("t;,)-"1 ,
Ab,, (tl.)-" : gEt
where Vn and V** denote the price of shares
equity shares in foreign intermediate firm n*,
((t 
- 
r7*r) nf*, + v&r) 
o
vft€1 
Pf
L'*t P;-
i(
c,t+L (rt;,) -"] j ( 1. 13)
in home intermediate
respectively. D* and
frrm r and the price of
D** are dividends paid
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I
by home and foreign firms r and fr* , respectively.
L.2.3 Asset market clearing
In equilibrium, households and firms are symmetric so that Brr+t : Br*t, Bil, : Bl+t,
Bllnr: BI,r+t and ff Si;f*rar : 
"SI,:!*, = &,r+r and f SkTio*: (1 - Qsi)'li =
SI,r+r. Sf'i*.^r. equity share holdings of foreign household j* in home firm r and Sf.'j. uru
equity share holdings of foreign household j* in foreign firm r*. Market clearing conditions
for the home and foreign bond are:
Bt+dj 
- 
0,
BI,t+Ldtj* 
- 
0.
The market clearing conditions for home and foreign equity shares are:
Idr,
Ldr*
1,"
lr" BI+pj * I"'
I^t 
s*,r+1 d'j* : 
Io"
I-'si,,+ itj* - l,'
(1.14)
(1.15)
(1.16)
(1.17)
T4
t.2.4 Intermediate goods sector and its ownership structure
The home intermediate good r e [0, a) is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm
that uses the following linear technology:
where Ay,1is productivity shock common to all producers and L'r,, is homogenous labor
used in the production of good r. The firms producing intermediate goods face nominal
rigidities. Following Rotemberg (1982), the nominal rigidities are in the form of a quadratic
cost of price adjustment.
The home firm r maximizes the present discounted value of the dividends, df 
,
Y*,t 
= 
Ax,tLk,t,
max E1
{p"(*),Lk,"}
d?
Yi:" _YP,: :Yrt,,
(1.18)
(1.le)
(1.20)
(t",4)
subject to
and
Since foreign households own
home firm r is Of : 0"-'#,
sector firms, the
+ 1,t * 2... and
(r.21)
discount factor for the
r is the tax rate on the
home intermediate
(#) -" ror s : t,t
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firm's revenues.
The first order condition with respect to labor is:
\f : Y!, e.22)
^x,t
which implies that the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (1.21), ,\f , is equal to the real
marginal cost. The first order condition with respect to the price implies a price which is
set as a markup over nominal marginal cost;
pt(r) 
- 
vf Pt\f 
,
(1.23)
where the markup equals
vT: ?Yft,,
with
o,=y*,4 (:eL- r) 
- 
u', 
I A /p'+r(*)\' (p'*'(*t 
- 
t)l
-' - 
-x,tpr-t(*) \pr-r(") -  -'l0f*rvrt,+tfi\ffi ) (-;1,f / )
In symmetric equilibriu^, pt(r) : Px,t. Foreign firms solve a similar problem and law
of one price holds: Px,t: e1Pfr,1, Py*,t: etP*-,t.
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L.2.5 Production of final goods
Production of final non-tradable goods
There is a continuum of symmetric perfectly competitive home firms on the interval n 
€
[0, a) producing home final non-tradable good N. The output of a representative firm at
time t is denoted by Yr.,r.t and is produced with the following linear technology:
YN,t 
= 
AN,tLN,t, (r.24)
where 41,.,1 is a productivity shock common to producers of home non-tradable good and
L7,r1 is homogenous labor used in the production of home non-tradable good. Taking the
price of labor, W1y, as given, the firm chooses labor, L11.1,to minimize its costs subject to
the production function. The first order condition for the firm is:
Production of final tradable goods
Rpx,t : ry!, (1.25)' AN.t
where u)N,t ? yff i, real wage in the non-tradable sector and -RP1,,,1 
= 
P# is the price of
good N in units of consumption basket. Foreign firms solve a similar problem.
There is a continuum of svmmetric
[0,o) producing home final tradable
stitution production function:
perfectly competitive home firms on the interval 
.f €
good F with the following constant elasticity of sub-
T7
YF,t: (1.26)
where Ypp is the amount of home final tradable good produced by a representative firm at
time t. The home final tradable good ,F is produced using two intermediate goods: a basket
X of home tradable differentiated intermediate goods and a basket X* of foreign tradable
differentiated intermediate goods. e > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign intermediate goods and 0 1 j 1 1 is the share of home intermediate good in the
production of home final tradable good.
Baskets of home and foreign intermediate goods are defined as follows:
(1.27)
[t: (xr)? + (L - -y)i (xil +] .--,
x1= 
Lt*) 
* 
lo" 
(xr(*))+ d"l 
,
fr. 
'+ fl o-t lb=Xi 
= | ( ,l- \' l' @i@.))T a".l ," L\l-ol Jo l
where 0 > L denotes the elasticity of substitution arnong intermediate goods and
r* denote home and foreign varieties of the intermediate goods. The definition
production function implies:
PF,t
and the definitions of the baskets of intermediate goods imply:
PX,t
(1.28)
r and
of the
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Px*,t:L(*)
where P; and P11* are the price indices of home and foreign baskets of intermediate goods
and p1(r) and p1(n") are the prices of varieties r and x*.
The representative firm's demands for baskets X and X* are:
x;: (r_nlfff-, r,,,
and the demands for individual goods r and r* by the representative firm are:
x1 _ jlffi] -'yF,t,
xr(r)
x; (r.) l,#)l -'x;
L Px*J )
Law of one price holds in
(1.32)
final tradable sector:
(1.2e)
(1.30)
(1.31)1
a
1
L-a
Foreign producers solve a similar problem.
PF,t 
- 
€1Pfr.r, PF*,t 
- 
€1Pfr".t.
t.2.6 Goods and labor market clearing
Market clearing conditions are as follows. Non-tradable goods can be consumed by house-
holds and government:
19
Ir" YN,td,n - lr" CN,tdl + aGt. (1.33)
Final tradable goods are consumed by home and foreign households:
lr" YF,tdf 
: 
Ir" cr,tdi * I"''h''r* (1.34)
final tradable goods.and intermediate goods are used in production of home and foreign
Markets clear for each varietv z:
1/rI X.t
Labor market clearing requires:
: 
Io" xt(*)d,f + l"' X*,t(")df 
* (1.35)
1,"
Lx,,tdj * lo" 
Lx,tdi : 
lo" 
L^r,tdn * lr" Lx,tdr. ( 1.36)
L.2.7 Fiscal and monetary policy
Government and fiscal policy
Government is not productive and public spending falls on final non-tradable good and
is denoted by G, which is per capita government consumption. Government finances its
consumption through lump-sum taxes imposed on consumers, taxes imposed on intermedi-
ate sector firms, labor income taxes, dividend income ta>res, and seigniorage revenue. The
20
government is required to balance its budget in every period.13 Tax rates are taken as
given and are calibrated to the EU data. The government uses the ratio of government
consumption to GDP as its instrument and pursues stabilization policy. Fiscal policy is
specified in terms of the following rule:ra
9t: ( GDnl /coeIa\GDP ) ,{o , (1.37)
where o, : ffi, fcop is the feedback parameter on GDP gap with respect to the
steady state, and, e{e is an exogenous shock to fiscal policy. This fiscal rule reflects an
output gap stabilization motive and is motivated by empirical literature.ls Foreign fiscal
policy is specified in a similar way.
Central bank and monetary policy
Home central bank issues home nominal money. Monetary policy in the home economy is
supports fixed exchange rate,16 which is in line with the requirement of the membership in
the Exchange Rate Mechanism prior to joining the monetary union.
Foreign central bank issues foreign nominal money. Foreign monetary policy is endoge-
nous and specified in terms of an interest rate rule:
t3Gov"tnment budget constraint is in the Appendix.
l4Beetsma and Jensen (2002) show that this class of fiscal rules performs well in their model.
lsEmpirical fiscal rules also take into account public deficit stabilization motive. See for example Gali and
Perotti (2003) who estimate fiscal rules for EMU/OECD countries and Favero and Monacelli (2003) for US
and references therein.
Gali and Perotti (2003) find empirical evidence that fiscal policies had been more and more countercyclical
in the EMU for the period 1980 until 2001 and that spending policies have had more important role as a
countercyclical tool, as opposed to the revenue policies, while the Government of Slovenia, for example,
announced it would be using fiscal policy for stabilization purposes after fxing the exchange rate to euro in
summer 2004.
16See Benigno et al. (2002) for details on how to fix the exchange rate.
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ttS"n"ral authors, Schmitt-Groh6 and Uribe (2003) among others,
in the case of a linear approximation of a model. However, their
unless a higher order approximation of this model delivers different
(1.3s)
report that welfare reversals may occur
critique is not directly applicable here
results.
where ml, mfip1, and mfio, are feedback parameters on previous period interest rate, CPI
inflation and GDP gap, respectively, and el^p is an exogenous shock to monetary policy.
1.3 Solution and parameterization of the model
1.3.1 Solution of the model and the steady state
Variables are expressed in real aggregate per capita terms. The model cannot be solved
analytically. Thus I find the rational expectations equilibrium of the log-linearized approx-
imation around the steady state.17 I employ the solution method for solving nonlinear
dynamic discrete-time stochastic models provided by Uhlig (1999) and find the recursive
equilibrium law of motion using the method of undetermined coefficients. The steady state
for the benchmark model with no foreign ownership has analytical solution but I use nu-
meric methods to solve for the steady state of the model with foreign ownership of home
intermediate firms.
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1.3.2 Parameterization
The home economy in this model represents the new EU members and the foreign economy
is designated to be the EMU.18 Thus, the size of the home country relative to the foreign
economy, a, is set to 5 percent.le The discount factor, B, equals 0.99 which implies an
annual real interest rate of around 4 percent. In line with the literature, the inverse of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption, o, is equal to 2. Following
Laxton and Pesenti (2003), the inverse of labor supply elasticity, Ty', is set to 2.5. I assume
logarithmic utility of government consumption so that on: l.
The share of home tradable consumption in the tradable consumption basket, u, and
the sha.re of home intermediate good in production of final tradable goods, .yl are equal to
a. The share of tradable consumption in the consumption basket, <p, equals 55 percent as
in Natalucci and Ravenna (2003).
The elasticity of substitution between non-tradable and tradable consumption, p, is set
to 0.5 as in Stockman and Tesar (1995) and the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign tradable good consumption, 17, is set to 1.5. e is the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign intermediate goods and is set to 0.5. The last two parameters are
taken from Natalucci and Ravenna (2003). I denotes the elasticity of substitution among
intermediate goods. I set 0 
- 
11, which together with the revenue tax of 0.2 implies a
markup of.I.375.20 The price adjustment cost parameter, K, is set to 77, as estimated by
Ireland (2001) for the US economy. All parameters for financial transaction costs are set to
18The model is calibrated to the EMU and the Czech Republic's data.
leThe new members' share of GDP in the EU total GDP is around 5 percenr.
2oMartins et al. (1996) estimate the average markup for manufacturing sector at t.2 for the OECD
countries. Some authors suggest that the range between 1.2 and 1.7 is reasonable. See Morrison (1994) and
Domowitz et al. (1988).
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0.01, which is standard in the literature.2l
I treat tax rates as parameters and set them equal to the values as in Quadrini (2004)
and Mendoza and Tesar (2003). Tax rate on revenue, r, equals 20 percent. Tax rate on
labor income is set to 37 percent and tax rate on dividends to 25 percent. The steady state
share of government purchases in GDP is calibrated to 18 percent.
Foreign monetary policy parameters are set as estimated by Smets and Wouters (2003).
The degree of interest rate smoothing, ml, is set to 0.95. The interest rate response to
inflation, mbru, equals 1.65 and the interest rate response to GDP, mboe, is set to 0.14.
f assume that home central bank supports fixed exchange rate, which is in line with the
ERM2, and keep this assumption across all model specifications.22 Galf and Perotti (2003)
estimate different specifications of fiscal rules for the Euro Area. Their spending rule for
the period after the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty indicates that primary spending-
to-potential output ratio reacts to output gap with the coefficient of 0.04 and that there
is high persistence of fiscal instrument; persistence parameter is estimated to be 0.8. I
approximate historic foreign fiscal policy by setting the reaction coeffi.cient to the output
gap to zero and incorporate high persistence coeffi.cient on past instrument with an AR(l)
fiscal shock. There are no empirical studies on fiscal policy rules for the new EU members.
Without loss of generality, I assume that also the new EU members have not been using
their fiscal policies as a stabilization tool until recently. Natalucci and Ravenna (2003)
and Devereux (2002) estimate government spending for the Czech Republic and Estonia as
2lGhironi et al. (2003) set these parameters to 0.025 to match reasonable persistence ofnet foreign assets.
22So*e of the new EU members have already fixed their exchange rate to euro in order to satisfy the
exchange rate criterion to enter the monetary union. However, past policies in most of these countries did
not have a regime ofa fixed exchange rate but I assume the exchange rate to be fixed in order to be consistent
across model specifications and for simplicity.
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AR(1) processes with the persistence parameters 0.7 and 0.8, respectively.
L.4 The effects and transmission of shocks and dynamic prop-
erties of the model
To understand how the model's transmission mechanism works, I first analyze impulse
responses of macroeconomic variables to a technology shock. I also investigate the effects of
a fiscal shock in order to show how fiscal policy actions in one country affect the variables
in the other economv.
t.4.L Foreign technology shock
I choose to analyze impulse responses of variables in both economies to a foreign technology
(and later fiscal) shock because home country only marginally affects the large economy
and most of the spillovers flow from the large to the small country.
Figures l-.1 and L.2 present impulse responses to a one-percent increase in foreign in-
termediate sector productivity. To understand the implications of the assumption about
foreign ownership of home intermediate sector firms, I show impulse responses for a bench-
mark model without foreign ownership (solid line) and the model where home intermediate
sector firms are exclusively foreign-owned (dashed line).
A positive productivity shock in foreign intermediate sector increases output of foreign
intermediate goods, reduces labor supply, and increases the wage rate in this sector. The
increase in productivity dominates the effect of higher wages so that marginal costs decrease.
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As a consequence, the relative price of foreign intermediate goods falls. Markup increases
to preserve profitability and the dividends are higher. This is reflected in an increase of
foreign share price
Productivity shock in foreign intermediate sector transmits to other sectors in the foreign
economy and also to the home economy. The shock directly transmits to foreign final
tradable goods firms, which use intermediate goods in their production. They enjoy lower
foreign input prices and therefore expand production of final tradable goods. Relative
prices of foreign final tradable goods decrease and the quantity demanded by home and
foreign households increases. Foreign households also demand more non-tradable goods
which increases labor demand and wages in foreign non-tradable sector. Foreign relative
price of non-tradable goods is consequently higher.
At the same time the original shock transmits to the home economy. Home final tradable
sector expands for the same reason as foreign final tradable sector (foreign inputs have higher
weight in production of final tradable goods) and home relative price of final tradable goods
decreases. There is an initial boom in home intermediate sector coming from higher home
and foreign demand because both, home and foreign inputs are required in the production of
final tradable goods. After the initial positive effect on home intermediate sector, demand
for home inputs decreases (prices are higher at home). Labor dynamics at home follow
output dynamics in the home intermediate sector. Higher demand for inputs initially results
in higher demand for intermediate labor and higherv/ages. Since labor is perfectly mobile
between the two sectors. it flows to the intermediate sector. Initiallv. home non-tradable
output declines but once the positive effect in the intermediate sector is reversed, labor in
intermediate sector is lower and output in non-tradable sector expands. Home relative price
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of non-tradable goods increases.
As a consequence of a positive productivity shock in foreign intermediate sector home
and foreign GDP and private consumptions expand. Foreign CPI inflation almost does not
responds due to opposite dynamics of prices of tradable and non-tradable goods, while home
CPI inflation increases because prices of tradable and non-tradable goods both increase.
As a result, the real exchange rate, which is defined as REt : #, declines (nominal
exchange rate is fixed). Home households initially borrow from foreign households but they
later accumulate foreign bonds because the shock results in higher expansion in the home
country.
L.4.2 Foreign fiscal shock
Figures 1.3 and 1-.4 present impulse responses to a one-percent increase in foreign fiscal
shock. A demand shock in the form of an increase of foreign government purchases-to-GDP
ratio increases demand for labor and output in foreign non-tradable sector. Government
consumption crowds out private non-tradable consumption and this cushions foreign wage
rate and relative price of non-tradable goods from a large increase. Higher wages in the
non-tradable sector attract labor from the intermediate sector and thus the wage in the
intermediate sector increases as well. Consequently, supply of foreign intermediate goods
falls and demand adjusts. Because of the opposite dynamics of labor cost and markup
in foreign intermediate sector the relative price of foreign inputs almost does not change.
Intermediate goods are inputs in production of final tradable goods, which decreases in both
countries. In the foreign economy, the relative price of final tradable goods stays almost
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the same. Foreign private consumption falls mainly due to the crowding out effect which
prevents foreign GDP from a significant expansion.
The shock transmits to the home economy because supply of foreign intermediate goods
drops and so does the production of home inputs. This reduces supply of home and foreign
final tradable goods. The relative price of home final tradable goods increases. Labor in
the home country reallocates to the non-tradable sector because of Iower labor demand and
wages in the intermediate sector. Higher labor supply in the non-tradable sector increases
production and reduces wages and relative prices in this sector. Overall home private
consumption decreases because consumption of final tradable goods is lower and almost
all of new non-tradable goods are consumed by the government which crowds out private
non-tradable consumption. Home GDP decrease.
Home CPI inflation decreases because the main components of home CPI inflation (home
prices of non-tradable goods and foreign prices of tradable goods) are lower. On the other
hand, foreign CPI does not change since all foreign prices stay almost constant. The real
exchange rate is thus driven by home prices and increases.
1.4.3 Estimates of macroeconomic variability
The previous section analyzed only the responses of variables in the two economies for a
given shock. Here I investigate how the model behaves when the two countries are hit by
all shocks at once. In order to do so, I need to make some assumptions about stochastic
processes. Empirical evidence on productivity shocks shows high persistence and positive
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correlation across countries.23 In my model, productivity shocks follow AR(l) processes. I
set persistence parameters of all productivity shocks to 0.9. Productivity shocks between
different sectors within a country are perfectly correlated as in Natalucci and Ravenna
(2003) and Laxton and Pesenti (2003). All other shocks are independent ofeach other. The
monetary shock in the foreign interest rate rule is and iid process. Persistence parameters
ofpreference shocks, labor disutility shocks and shocks to shifts in preferences between non-
tradable and tradable goods are set to 0.7,0.9 and 0.9, respectively. I choose the standard
deviations of the shocks to match some of the moments of macroeconomic variables given
historic economic policies and baseline parameter values. The details on stochastic processes
are in Table 1.3.
The second moments of the model (with foreign ownership) and the values from the
data are presented in Table 1.4. The model generates almost twice as much variability in
GDP in the new EU members comDared to the Euro Area and the absolute values of the
standard deviations of GDP are consistent with the variabilitv in the historic data. For
the Czech Republic, the model performs well in the sense that all of the GDP components
are more volatile than GDP itself. However, exports and imports in the model are less
volatile than their historic counterparts. This may be explained by the fact that there is
no capital/investment in my model. Investment is the most volatile component of the GDP
and since investment goods are not part of exports and imports in my model, the volatility
of exports and imports may be understated. The government expenditure is more volatile
in the model than in historic data.2A There is a trade-off between matching the volatility
"S"" for example Backus et al.2aThe variability of government
directly. I thus correct for the fact
(ree2).
expenditure enters the welfare function used
that the variability of government purchases is
in the policy experiments
too high by adjusting the
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of government purchases and matching the rest of the variables in this exercise.
The CPI inflation rate is more volatile and interest rate is somewhat less volatile than in
the data. This could be due to the monetary regime that I assume for the smaller economy
in the model. In order to mimic current arrangement of the institutions in the new EU
member states and to keep the strategic games among policymakers as simple as possible, I
assume that the smaller economy supports a fixed exchange rate regime. However, historic
moments are based on a monetary regime that is not a fixed exchange rate regime.
For the Euro Area. the CPI inflation and the interest rate are less variable in the
model because of the assumption of an inflation-targeting regime, which is similar to the
model properties of Laxton and Pesenti (2003). While data suggest less variability of GDP
components than that of the GDP itself for the Euro Area, the model generates about the
same volatility for each of them.
The dynamic properties of the model can be partially compared to the model of Laxton
and Pesenti (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003). The model of Natalucci and Ravenna
(2003) performs better in terms of the CPI inflation rate and the interest rate. Given that
I assume a fixed exchange rate regime (and they do not) this is not surprising. As for the
other variables, the model performs at least as well as their model. I cannot compare the
dynamics for the Euro Area to Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) since they assume that the
rest of the world is exogenous and do not model the second country.
The model in Laxton and Pesenti (2003) is a highly sophisticated model with many
realistic ingredients which I do not include in my model. Therefore, the overall performance
of their model in matching the second moments is better. Nonetheless, both models fail to
weight on government purchases in the welfare function.
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match the CPI inflation rates and interest rates. As
of exports and imports in my model compared to the
the lack of investment in the model. Finally, the real
explained above, the lower volatilities
historic date may be a consequence of
exchange rate is much better matched
in my model compared to Laxton and Pesenti (2003).
L.4.4 The role of foreign ownership
Table 1.5 presents the standard deviations of selected variables for the model with for-
eign ownership of firms in the home economy (Foreign) and for the model without foreign
ownership of home firms (Local). The volatility of most variables in the home economy is
higher in the model where foreign households own home firms compared to the model with-
out foreign ownership (higher volatility can also be inferred from some impulse responses).
When foreign households own home intermediate sector firms home households no longer
receive state-contingent dividend income and their ability to insure themselves and smooth
consumption is thus reduced. Home households can insure themselves against the risk of
the firms only through labor supply. As a consequence home private consumption along
with most other variables is more volatile when foreign households own home intermediate
sector firms. On the other hand, home labor effort and imports are slightly less volatile in
this case.
Comparison of the second moments of selected variables between the model with and
without foreign ownership of firms in the home economy reveals that the two models per-
form similarly in matching the second moments of the data.25 The model with foreign
25One should keep in mind that the standard deviations of the shocks are chosen to match the moments
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ownership performs better in matching the volatilities of consumption, exports and the real
exchange rate even though both models understate the volatilities of the three variables,
while government expenditure, CPI inflation rate and imports are better matched in the
model without foreign ownership. Government expenditure and the CPI inflation rate both
overstate the data in both models while imports are understated. The real GDP may be
better matched in the model with foreign ownership given the fact that Laxton and Pesenti
(2003) estimate the standard deviation of the Czech GDP at 2 percent. The ownership
structure in the home economy has negligible effects on the foreign economy.
1.5 Design of fiscal and monetary policy
So far I have assumed that fiscal and monetary policies are conducted by use of historic
empirical rules. Such specification is useful because it helps us understand how shocks are
transmitted to macroeconomic variables and provides basis for empirical evaluation of the
underlying model.
In this section I turn to the core question of my analysis: Are there gains from fiscal
cooperation between new and incumbent members of the European Union? Before I answer
this question, I specify the goals of fiscal and monetary authorities and the structure of the
policymakers' strategic game.
I assume that policymakers choose stabilization policy i.e. reaction parameters in their
policy rules, to maximize unconditional expectation of households' welfare and that they
and are not estimates from the data. The estimated standard deviations of shocks may imply a different
conclusion about the relative performance of the two models.
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can commit to the rules. Given the class of rules considered, such fiscal and monetary
policies are optimal.26 I use numeric optimization to solve for optimal policies. The welfare
function is derived as a second-order Taylor approximation to the utility function and can
be expressed in each period t as:27
wt: 
-* oer-oror@)z
where e, T, and G are the steady
( 1.39)
state values of consumption, labor and government
to optimal policy within the class of rules specified in the model.
not matter for welfare as cornrnon in the literature"
- ;rl,Tt*{ ,or(ir) *" r"r-og ua,r(Gr),
purchases and hats denote percentage deviations from the steady state.
The definitions of strategic games among policymakers are as follows. Non-cooperative
gamer Each government chooses its reaction parameter to GDP to maximize the uncondi-
tional expectation of its households' welfare, taking the behavior of the other government
and the foreign central bank as given. Foreign central bank chooses response parameters to
inflation and GDP to maximize unconditional expectation of foreign households' welfare,
taking the behavior of the governments as given. All parameters are chosen simultaneously.
Fiscal cooperation: The two governments act as a "single" policymaker and each choose its
response parameter to GDP to jointly maximize the unconditional expectation of a weighted
average of home and foreign welfare, taking the behavior of foreign central bank as given.
The weights in the joint welfare function are the relative sizes of the countries. The foreign
central bank chooses parameters in its rule to maximize unconditional expectation of foreign
households' welfare, taking the behavior of the governments as given. All policymakers act
simultaneously.
'uln what follows, optimal policy refers2tI assrlme that real money balances do
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1.5.1 Optimal fiscal and monetary policies and the desirability of fiscal
cooperation in the EU
Benchmark model without foreign ownership
To understand how foreign ownership of the firms affects fiscal and monetary policy and
fiscal cooperation, I first analyze a benchmark case without foreign ownership. Table 1.1
presents optimal fiscal and monetary reaction coefficients to GDP and inflation and the
associated welfare losses for the models with and without foreign ownership.
Table L.L: Optimal Responses to Output and Inflation and the Associated Welfare Losses
fcnp f&np mbpr mbnp L L*
Foreign Ownership
Non-cooperation
Cooperation
-0.925 -27.998 1.648
-L.L37 -4L 606 1.363
80.00 13.853 0.963
80.01 13.972 0.970
No Foreign Ownership
Non-cooperation
Cooperation
-0.L79 -28.098 1.723
-0.306 -28.0L7 r.720
80.44 8.574 0.946
80.00 8.578 0.945
Result L.t Optimal poli,cies are countercycli,cal and call for rnore aggressi,ue stabilizat'ion
of output gap than historic poli,ci,es.
It is optimal for foreign fiscal and monetary authority to respond strongly to output gap
and this is consistent with a less aggressive home fiscal policy. The home country benefits
from stabilization policy of the foreign country for two reasons: First, it is a small open
economy with strong trade links to the foreign country and thus very exposed to anything
that happens in the large economy. When foreign policymakers stabilize their own economy
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they also reduce volatility in the home country. Second, the home economy supports a fixed
exchange rate and therefore "imports" foreign monetary policy.28
Result L.2 The home country is better off i,n the non-cooperat'iue equili,briurn and the
f orei,g n eco nonxy pref er s fis cal co operat'i, o n.
In a world with a small and a large country, one would expect that policy cooperation
may not matter for the large economy but could make sense for the small country. The
results in the benchmark model support this intuition and the large economy is more or
less indifferent between cooperating and not cooperating its fiscal policy with the smaller
country. Moreover, the large economy almost does not change its policy when it cooperates
with the small country. The small country, on the other hand, pursues a more aggressive
fiscal policy when it internalize its (small) spillovers on the large economy.2e As a result,
the home country is worse off in the cooperative equilibrium since in this equilibrium the
focus is on maximizing foreign welfare and stabilizing shocks in the large economy.3o
Model with foreign-owned home intermediate sector firms
I now turn to empirically more relevant case where I assume that foreign households are
exclusive owners of home intermediate sector firms and investigate the differences in optimal
31policies and fiscal cooperation with respect to the benchmark model.
2EForeign expansionary monetary policy increases home GDP.
2eThe change in home fiscal policy's response is small because the externalities from home to foreign
country are almost negligible.
3oBoth governments choose their policies to mainly maximize foreign welfare. Foreign central bank is
ma:<imizing foreign welfare and there is no home central bank that would maximize its households' well-
being.
31Ho*e firms producing final goods remain locally-owned.
35
Result I.3 Home fiscal policy is more aggress'iue compared to the benchmark model.
Most of the variables in the home economv are more volatile in the model with exclusive
foreign ownership in the home intermediate sector compared to the benchmark case.32
Therefore, it is optimal for home fiscal policy to play a more active stabilization role.
The difference in the volatility of the foreign economy's variables between the two models
is negligible so that foreign fiscal policy remains almost the same in the non-cooperative
equilibrium.
Result L.4 Foreign fiscal poli,cy is rnore aggress'iue i,n the cooperatiue equilibrium com-
pared to the benchmark model.
As in the benchmark model, when governments cooperate, they choose parameters in
their rules to maximize a weighted average of home and foreign welfare. However, variables
in the home economy are more volatile and foreign fiscal policy causes bigger spillovers on
the small country in the model with foreign ownership.3s This is the reason why foreign fiscal
policy in more aggressive under fiscal cooperation and now contributes to the stabilization
of shocks in the home economv.
Result L.5 Forei,gn monetary poli,cy's react'ion to infl,ati,on i,s smaller under fi,scal coop-
eration.
The importance of foreign central bank's inflation stabilization under fiscal cooperation
is reduced. This can be explained by analyzing some impulse responses.34 Contractionary
t'S"" the explanation in the section on transmission mechanism.tts"" impulse responses in the section on transmission mechanism.
tns"" Figure 1.5.
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monetary policy triggers expansionary foreign fiscal policy and reduces foreign consumption.
This consumption reduction is magnified by the expansionary fiscal policy. Under fiscal
cooperation, foreign government reacts stronger to monetary actions and thus the indirect
effect of foreign fiscal policy on foreign private consumption is larger. But because foreign
monetary authority chooses its policy parameters to maximizes foreign households' utility
and households dislike consumption variability, it is optimal for the foreign central bank
not to respond as strongly to inflation as under non-cooperative fiscal game.
Result -1,.6 Both countries are better off in the non-cooperatiue equi,li,brium.
In the model with foreign ownership home households do not receive state-contingent
dividend income and their abilitv to insure themselves is reduced. Most of the variables
in the smaller country become more volatile (private consumption, GDP). Therefore, both
governments are more active in stabilizing the smaller economy when they cooperate and
government purchases in both countries are more volatile.
Foreign fiscal rule is successful in stabilizing GDP in the large economy but it intro-
duces excessive volatility in foreign private consumption when governments cooperate fiscal
policies. The non-tradable private consumption becomes more volatile because government
consumption, which is on non-tradable goods, is more volatile. Foreign tradable private
consumption is also more volatile under fiscal cooperation. More volatility comes from for-
eign technology shock in the non-tradable sector. This is not surprising since under fiscal
cooperation, the weight shifts to stabilizing shocks which affect both countries.ss Foreign
non-tradable technology shock increases volatility of foreign inputs and consequently the
3sForeign technolory shock in the non-tradable sector does not afiect quantities in the home economy.
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volatility in the production of foreign final tradable goods. Thus, foreign tradable con-
sumption is more volatile.36 The foreign central bank cushions the effect of more volatile
foreign government purchases on foreign private consumption. However, higher volatility
of government purchases has the dominant effect on foreign private consumption. Private
consumption is by far the most important component of welfare and foreign households are
thus worse off under fiscal cooperation.
The interaction between fiscal policy and private consumption in the home economy
is qualitatively the same as in the foreign country. More volatile government purchases
translate into more volatile non-tradable private consumption. On the contrary, home
tradable private consumption is less volatile under fiscal cooperation. Most of home tradable
private consumption is on foreign goods and the production of those goods is more volatile.
However, there is a key difference between foreign and home prices and less volatility in home
prices translates into less volatility of quantities consumed. Another factor in determining
the volatility of home private consumption is the foreign central bank which chooses its
policy parameters to maximize foreign welfare. Nonetheless, foreign central bank has a
positive effect on home private consumption (for the same reason as in the foreign economy).
The overall effect of fiscal cooperation on home private consumption is positive but the
reduction in volatility is very small. This small welfare-improving effect is not enough to
counterbalance more volatility in labor supply and government purchases and also home
households are worse off under fiscal cooperation.
36Recall that most of final tradable consumption is on foreign goods.
Also, increased volatility in foreign non-tradable consumption does not come from the foreign non-tradable
technology shock. The non-tradable private consumption is more volatile because of more aggressive fiscal
policy.
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L.5.2 Some sensitivity analysis
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution of government purchases
The estimates of the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of government
consumption, ost are not readily available. f assume logarithmic utility of government
purchases in the benchmark calibration, which implies a weight of 0.5 on government pur-
chases in the welfare function.37 I reduce this weight to 0.3 which implies og : 0.81 and
the relative weight of 0.2 on government purchases compared to private consumption. As
a consequence, the stabilization role of home government is increased but foreign policies
are very similar to the case of logarithmic preferences over government consumption. Both
countries are still better off in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Weights in the joint welfare function
The question of weights in the joint welfare function is of political nature and one could
object to almost any selection of the weights. The literature on fiscal cooperation usually
assumes that the weights in the joint welfare function are equal to the relative sizes of
the countries. The results reported above follow such specification. However, I conduct
a sensitivity analysis with respect to the weights and find that qualitative results do not
change if the two countries have equal weight in the joint welfare function.
37The weight on consumption is around 1.5.
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All policymakers cooperate
The model I use incorporates some realistic assumption about the conduct of economic
policies in the European Union. I assume that the new EU members participate in the
ERM (by supporting a fixed exchange rate) and are not yet members of the monetary
union. Thus, there is no explicit policy cooperation between the monetary authorities of
the new EU members and the EMU. I also assume that fiscal and monetary policies are set
in a non-cooperative fashion which is the case in the EU. Therefore, the results presented
above should not be surprising and are consistent with the literature.
For completeness, I also solve the model in which all policymakers cooperate on their
policies.ss It is interesting that a cooperation among the three " active" players, namely the
two governments and the foreign central bank, is not enough to make both countries better
off compared to the non-cooperative solution and the solution where only governments
cooperate. However, both countries are better off when all four policymakers cooperate. In
this case, I assume that the home central bank conducts stabilization policy and follows an
interest rate rule similar to the foreign central bank's rule.
1.6 Conclusions
In this Chapter I study how fiscal policies should be conducted in the enlarged European
Union. I find that there is room for fiscal stabilization but there is no need for the national
governments of the new EU members and the EMU members to cooperate on their fiscal
38Such specification is not close to the current arrangement in the EU/EMU.
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policies. In fact, fiscal cooperation is welfare.reducing for both groups of countries. An
important factor which contributes to this result is the presence of foreign ownership of
firms in the new EU members. When there is no foreign ownership, the EMU is indifferent
between cooperating and not cooperating but the new EU members still prefer not
cooperate on fiscal policy with the EMU.
In this Chapter I assume that the two countries have national monetary policies.
to
In
the future, the new EU countries will have to join the monetary union (EMU). It would
thus be of interest to analyze the need for fiscal cooperation between the two groups of
countries considered in this paper when they constitute a monetary union. In this case,
a single central bank would have a different role and would interact differently with the
national governments. I leave this extension for future research.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
Foreign household j*', budget constraint is:
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As opposed to home households, foreign consumers buy and trade shares in home and
foreign intermediate sector firms and do not hold home bonds. Bf denotes foreign bonds
held by foreign consumers, S1*, are shares in foreign frrm r* held by a foreign consumer
entering period I and Sfl are shares in home frrm r held by a foreign consumer entering
period t. The price of shares of foreign frrm r* is denoted by Vf. and the price of shares of
home frrm r is denoted bV Uf . Foreign households receive dividends on foreign and home
shares, Df. and Df , respectively. They pay dividend tax at the rate of. r! and r!- .
Home government budget constraint is:
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Table I.2: Foreign Share of Equity Market Capitalization in CEEC
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Share in percent
Slovenia
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
8.86 7.98
31.50 64.00 72.30
68.30 79.20
10.51 19.68 6.01
75.80 79.30 80.88
- r+.oo
7.77
76.74
70.70
Sources: Ljubljana Stock Exchange, Tallinn Stock Exchange, Riga Stock Exchange,
Latvian Central Depository, Reininger et al. (2001).
Table 1.3: Assumptions About Stochastic Processes
Standard Deviation Persistence Parameter
Home Foreign Home Foreign
Productivity
Marginal Utility of Consumption
Marginal Disutility of Labor
Preference Shifter
Government/GDP
Interest Rate
0.0200
0.0387
0.0100
0.0089
0.0032
0.0087
0.0224
0.0032
0.0032
0.0010
0.0032
0.9
0,7
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.7
0.9
0.9
0.9
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Table 1.4: Macroeconomic Variabilitv of the Czech Republic and the Euro Area
Czech Republic Euro Area
Model Historic Model Historic
Standard deviation (in %)
Real GDP
Consumption
Government Expenditure
CPI Inflation
Short-Term Interest Rate
Employment
Exports
Imports
Real Exchange Rate
1.87
2.23
4.66
2.39
0.36
0.91
2.33
2.r4
3.05
r.74
2.29
2.6*
1.08
0.47
3.9*
4.L*
3.1
1.01
L.02
1.08
0.25
0.36
0.63
1.0x
0.8*
0.6*
0.56
0.98
1.16
2.4*
3.1*
Note: The model's variables are detrended with HP filter. Estimates of historic standard
deviations that are taken from Laxton and Pesenti (2003) are marked by a star. The rest
of estimates for the Czech Republic are taken from Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) and for
the Euro Area they are taken from Fagan et al. (2001). Data in Laxton and Pesenti (2003)
are detrended with HP filter using the smoothness parameter of 1600. The time period for
the Euro Area data is from 1970Q1 to 2002Q4 and for the Czech Republic from 1973Q1
tu 20A2Q4. In Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) all series are logged (except for interest and
inflation rates) and HP filtered. Data are per capita and seasonally adjusted. Time span
for the Czech Republic is 1994Q1 to 2003Q1. In Fagan et al. (forthcoming), variables are
expressed in per capita terms and logged (except for inflation and interest rates). They are
seasonally adjusted and HP filtered.
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Table 1.5: Macroeconomic Variability in the Model with and without Foreign Ownership
Czech Republic Euro Area
Foreign Local Foreign Local
Standard deviation (itr %)
Real GDP
Consumption
Government Expenditure
CPI Inflation
Short-Term Interest Rate
Employment
Exports
Imports
Real Exchange Rate
Note: Foreign refers to the model with foreign ownership
in the home economy. Local refers to the model in which all
there is no foreign ownership of firms in the home economy.
of intermediate sector firms
firms are locally-owned, i.e.
1.87
2.23
4.66
2.39
0.36
0.91
2.33
2.L4
3.05
r.64
1.95
3.96
2.23
0.36
0.97
2.2r
2.27
2.88
1.01
L.02
1.08
0.25
0.36
0.63
1.01
r.02
1.08
0.25
0.36
0.63
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Figure 1.2: Impulse Responses of Home Variables to Foreign Technology Shock
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Figure 1.3: Impulse Responses of Foreign Variables to Foreign Fiscal Shock
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Figure 1.4: Impulse Responses of Home Variables to Foreign Fiscal Shock
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Figure 1.5: Explaining Why Monetary Policy is Looser Under Fiscal Cooperation
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Chapter 2
The New EU Members and the
Monetary l-Inion
2.L Introduction
Eight Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC)joined the European Union (EU) in
2004.1 These countries will have to join the monetary union after they have met the entry
conditions. Even though they cannot opt out from the monetary union, it is of interest
to study how the membership in the euro currency area will affect them. In this paper I
investigate whether it is beneficial for the CEEC to participate in the monetary union. In
order to do so I analyze three monetary arrangements that are relevant for the CEEC. I
choose to compare a monetary union to a flexible and a fixed exchange rate regime since
these countries will have gone througtr a transition of floating exchange rate regimes a.nd
twithout loss of generality I leave Cyprus and Malta out of my study.
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a participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) by the time they join the euro
currency area.
I build a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model which mimics the
dynamics of the CEEC (home, small country) and the Euro Area (foreign, large country). I
compare the outcome of a monetary union (CEEC's participation in the European Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU)) to the outcomes of a flexible and a fixed exchange rate regime
in the CEEC based on households' utility and optimal monetary and fiscal policies.2 The
main result can be summarized as follows. The households in the CEEC orefer a flexible
exchange rate regime to a monetary union and a monetary union to a fixed exchange
rate regime. Under a fixed exchange rate regime there is only fiscal policy available to
directly stabilize the variables in the home country while there are benefits from monetary
stabilization in the case of a flexible exchange rate regime and a monetary union. However,
a flexible exchange rate regime is preferred to a monetary union. In a monetary union a
single central bank stabilizes a weighted average of the two countries' inflation and output
and thus shocks that affect the home country are better absorbed when there is a home
central bank which pursues stabilization policy.
Surprisingly, not many theoretical studies, especially the studies within the framework
of the new open economy macroeconomics, have addressed the issue of costs and benefits
of joining a monetary union. There is only one paper which uses the latest techniques
and analyzes the consequences of CEEC's participation in the monetary union. Buyoumi
transportation costs and aet al. (2004) focuses on assessing the benefits of the fall in
2See the section on policy design for more details on optimal policies.
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higher level of trade integration from entering the EMU.3 They find that even a small fall
in trade costs can significantly increase trade in the long-run and that lower trade costs
due to the introduction of the euro generate welfare gains. My work on the other hand
focuses on the loss of sovereign monetary policy in the CEEC and my results are based on
optimal monetary (and fiscal) policies while monetary policy is not optimal in Bayoumi at
al. (2004).
Other studies of the CEEC do not analyze the issue of these countries'participation in
the monetary union. In Chapter t I study the need for fiscal cooperation between the new
EU members and the EMU before the CEEC join the monetary union. Devereux (2002),
Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) and Laxton and Pesenti (2003) evaluate different monetary
arrangements, but not a monetary union, for the CEEC based on a volatility criterion.
Similar to the latter studies are the analyses of monetary regimes for emerging/developing
countries. Examples of these are Ghironi and Rebucci (2003) and Devereux et al. (200q.4
Except for Bayoumi et al. (2004) there are only few other recent studies of costs and
benefits of joining a monetary union. One example is Carr6 and Collard (2003) which use a
micro-founded model similar to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and study the effects of a specific
shock (either technology or fiscal shock) on welfare. They conclude that a monetary union
is beneficial for households of the country in which a permanent technology or fiscal shock
originates but disadvantageous to the households of the other country. As in most studies
mentioned above, monetary and fiscal policies in Carr6 and Collard (2003) are not chosen
optimally. Lane (2000) compares stabilization properties of a currency union to alternative
3Their paper is partially motivated by empirical literature on the impact of a currency union on trade.
See Bayoumi et al. (2004) for references on this empirical literature.
aResults in these two studies are based on a welfare criterion.
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exchange rate regimes (given a specific shock) in a Canzoneri-Henderson setup. One of his
results resembles my result in that a currency union in his model dominates a fixed exchange
rate regime in terms of stabilization properties and a flexible exchange rate generates lower
Iosses than a currency union. Similarly, Ca'Zorzi and de Santis (2003) study the impact
of accession to a monetary union on inflation and output in a Barro-Gordon setup. They
conclude that the EMU is beneficial for the CEEC if the variance of the supply and the real
exchange rate shock falls sufficiently after the EMU enlargement.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. I present the model in Section 2.
Parameterization of the model is explained in Section 3. In Section 4,I analyze the effects
and transmission of monetary and technology shocks, dynamic properties of the model, and
the volatility of some macroeconomic variables under different monetary regimes. I present
the design of monetary and fiscal policies and results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 A general equilibrium model of the European lJnion
2.2.L Overview of the economic environment
The model builds on the model from Chapter 1 and mimics the structure of the enlarged
EU and in particular the nature of the newly admitted members. First, it incorporates the
presence of foreign ownership of the firms in Central and Eastern Europe which has arisen
as a consequence of foreign financing of caching up with the rest of the EU. This feature
was first introduced into literature by myself in Chapter 1. Second, intermediate goods
represent a substantial part of imports of these countries and contribute to the dynamics of
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macroeconomic variables. Third, domestic tradable goods are exported and consumed by
domestic households. Fourth, non-tradable sector is important and most of the government
purchases are on non-tradable goods. Taking all of the above into consideration provides
more flexibility to match the data and more realistic interdependencies between the Central
and Eastern European countries and the Euro Area.
The theoretical framework that I use for mv analvsis is a micro-founded dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium model. The foreign country in the model is designated to fit the
European Economic and Monetary Union and the home country represents an aggregate of
the new members of the EU. In each country there are households, firms, fiscal authority
(government) and monetary authority (central bank). Foreign variables are indexed by a
star.
Households in both countries are infinitely lived and have preferences over consumption,
real money balances, labor supply, and government purchases. Each household consumes
domestic final non-tradable goods, domestic final tradable goods and imported final trad-
able goods. Each household supplies homogenous labor to domestic firms producing final
non-tradable goods and to domestic firms producing intermediate tradable goods. Labor
is perfectly mobile between the sectors within a country. The labor market is perfectly
competitive and labor is immobile internationally. Households trade short-term nominal
bonds. There are two bonds, home and foreign, denominated in home and foreign currency,
respectively. Only the foreign denominated bond is traded internationally.s
The ownership structure of the firms and the equity share trade is as follows: I assume
5In the case of a monetary union, there is only one bond which is denominated in the single currency
and is traded internationallv.
oo
that owners of home a.nd foreign intermediate sector firms are foreign households who trade
home and foreign equity shares and
sector firms.O Firms in other sectors
receive dividends from home and foreign intermediate
are owned bv domestic households.
Each country produces three types of goods: final non-tradable goods, final tradable
goods and a continuum of differentiated intermediate tradable goods. The final non-tradable
goods are produced by perfectly competitive firms using domestic labor as an input. Final
non-tradable goods can be consumed by households and by the government. The firms
which produce the final tradable goods operate in a perfectly competitive environment.
Their goods are produced by combining domestic and imported intermediate goods and
are used for private consumption. Each intermediate tradable good is produced by a single
firm in a monopolistically competitive environment. The input used in production of each
intermediate good is domestic labor. The intermediate goods are used in production of the
final tradable good. In the intermediate sector, there are nominal rigidities in the form of
a quadratic cost of price adjustment.
Government spending falls on the final non-tradable good and is financed through lump-
sum tax revenues and seigniorage. Government conducts stabilization fiscal policy. I con-
sider several monetary regimes. First, I analyze the case of a fixed exchange rate where the
foreign central bank follows an interest rate rule and the home central bank supports a fixed
exchange rate. Second, I investigate the case of a flexible exchange rate in both countries.
In the third scenario the two countries constitute a monetarv union.
6The sector that is exclusively
not an extreme assumption about
foreign-owned is only one out of three sectors. This assumption is thus
the extent of foreign presence.
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2.2.2 l{ouseholds and their trading opportunities
Utility function
Home consumer 7's utility function has the following form:
oo
u!: Et\,0'
i_0
, 
(r,r*n) 
7-og 
, n.@) 
1-d
- L 
"n 
TX L-O -A7,,(11,r.r1 , er)+v 
I 
)
where labor supply equals Lt : LN,t + Lx,t, and labor is homogenous and perfectly mobile
between the sectors within the country, Cr is the consumption basket, P1 is consumption
price index, and M1 are nominal money balances, and G1 are government purchases. B is
the discount factor, j is tne elasticity of intertemporal substitution of private consumption,
$ is ttre elasticity of substitution of real money balances and f is labor supply elasticity.
46,1 is a preference shock and A7p is a shock to labor disutility. Home consumers are
indexed by j 
€ [0, a) and a is the relative size of the home country. Foreign households'
utility function is similar to the home one and foreign households are indexed by j* e [a,I].
fntra-temporal allocation of consumption
Total consumption, C!, is a composite index of non-tradable and tradable consumption
baskets, Cfu,, ana Ct7,r, r""p""tively:
(t+,,)*]tt'-rpl Tr\Jut1 :
l-L
p.-L(p)n[r'- p,)i (rk,,)
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(2.2)
where 0 I gt ( 1 is the share of tradable consumption in the consumption basket and
p, > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between non-tradable and tradable consumption. The
(log of) tradable goods' weight, gr, is subject to an autocorrelated disturbance term around
the steady state mean. This shock represents shifts in home residents' preferences from
non-tradable to tradable goods. Cfu is a basket of final non-tradable goods produced by
perfectly competitive firms.
Consumption index of tradable goods is defined as:
r'0uTrt:
PT,t
where Pry and P7 are the prices
tively, and Pp and Pp* are the
respectively.
-r)+ (r,r.,r)+] *,P+ (t',,,) ' +(1 (2.3)
where 0 ( a,r ( 1 is the share of home tradable consumption and 11 > 0 is the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign tradable good consumption. CJ, and, Ct - ut"
baskets of home and foreign final tradable goods also produced by perfectly competitive
firms.
The definitions of consumption preferences imply:
P1 : [f t - gt) (P.nr, ,)r-r * gt (Pr,r)t-'] -u ,
- ['r PF't)t-'
of non-tradable and tradable consumption baskets, respec-
prices of home and foreign baskets of final tradable goods,
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The deman,Cs for baskets C+ and ck
C'r,r: gtf+l-r ,'Ln) vtt
f px,rl_, ni(1 
- e) Lel ci,
and the demands for home and foreign baskets of final tradable goods are:
c'r,r- alffi]-' ,[,r,
(1 
-,) lH] -'c+,,
Foreign households solve a similar problem.
f nter-temporal opt irnization
The budget constraint for home household 7 is:
(2.4)
rtJ
-N,t (2 .5)
rjvr..* +L ju
(2.6)
(2.7)
Home household , consumes , Cl, pays net lump-sum taxes, T{ , and receives wage income,
W1g3L!17.r-lWx,tLk.t.Household j holds domestic money, Mi, and,home and foreign bond.s,
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B and B*, denominated in home and foreign currency, respectively. B{*, is the stock of
home bonds held by household 7 entering period f * 1 and Bil, is the stock of foreign
bonds held by household j entering period t + I. e; is the nominal exchange rate in units
of home currency per one unit of foreign currency. The short-term nominal interest rates i1
and if are paid at the beginning of period t and are known at time t 
- 
1. Only the foreign
bond is traded internationally. There are intermediation costs for households entering the
AL,t
lUN,t : LilX,t 
-
AC,t
where u)N,t j Yff 
""a 
u)x,t : ff ur" real wages in the final non-tradable sector and
intermediate sector, respectively. The first order conditions with respect to home and
foreign bond holdings are:
international bond market./ The revenue from the intermediation is rebated to the home
consumers as a lump-sum transaction cost transfer, TCT|.8 In equilibrium, the rebate
' ',
equals TCrl:+ f 1#'l-.
\Pt)
Each household chooses labor supply, bond and money holdings, and consumption path
to maximize expected utility (2.1) subject to the budget constraint (2.8). The first order
conditions with respect to labor are:
('t)r
(rt (2-e)
(2.10)AC,t (tr) -": p(L*'it+t \ n l- P1) Et lrr-Ac,t+r (tt*,)-"] ,
TThe intermediation costs are introduced to guarantee that net bond positions follow a stationary process
and economies converge asymptotically to a steady state. See Schmitt-Groh6 and Uribe (2003) on this and
other approaches on how to pin down the steday state values of bonds.
8I assn-e that intermediaries are perfectly competitive and owned by domestic households.
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Unlike home households, foreign households trade only foreign bonds and they also
trade equity shares in home and foreign intermediate sector firms. Their budget constraint
is presented in the Appendix. The first order conditions with respect to home and foreign
shares are:
Ab,r(rl")-" : ,,'t[+ .t* \t+l ) ^*
- 
-fl.r
Ac,, (tl) -"
where Vr and V**
equity shares in for
by home and foreig
(nrh * uff
vf- C,t+T
(ti*) -"][t. €s. (2. 1 1)
*
c,t+1
(2.r2)
(2 13)
price of
ds paid
('r;,)-"] ,
Ab,r (tl.)-" : oEt (nf*, +u&r) ovf
e
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CI
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r
denote
eign int
n firms
€t P;
€t+t P{*t
.* . 
-OlCtt*t) | '.J
firm r and the
D** are dividen
the pri
ermedi
r and
of shares in home intermediate
e firm fr* , respectively. D' and
, respectively.
2.2.3 Asset market clearing
In equilibrium, households and firms are symmetric so that Bl+t: Br*r, Biir: Bl+t,
Bllir: BI,t+t and ff Si,1,l*rar : 
"Si,:!*, = ,S*,r+r and f; Su|\O*: (1 - alSi)1, =
SI,r+r. SI'i* ur" equity share holdings of foreign household j* in home firm r and fi3-'r. ur"
equity share holdings of foreign household j* in foreign firm r*. Market clearing conditions
for the home and foreign bond are:
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1,"
Bt+dj 
- 
0, (2.L4)
lr" Bl+fij * I,t Bl,r*tdo* - o' (2.15)
The market clearing conditions for home and foreign equity shares are:
5*'t*1 dj* Idr,
Yrt,r 
= 
Ax,tLk,t,
l,'
I,'
(2.L6)
(2.18)
SI,r+ ft* Ldr* (2.r7)
2.2.4 Intermediate goods sector and its ownership structure
The home intermediate good r 
€ [0, a) is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm
that uses the following linear technology:
where Ay,1 is productivity shock common to all producers and Lfr, is homogenous labor
used in the production of good r. The firms producing intermediate goods face nominal
rigidities. Following Rotemberg (1982), the nominal rigidities are in the form of a quadratic
cost of price adjustment.
The home firm r maximizes the present discounted value of the dividends, df 
,
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max E1
{p" (t) ,Lk,"} (t"'4) (2.le)
subject to
Kt (2.20)
and
vii":vp,i :v9*. (2.2t)
Since foreign households own home intermediate sector firms, the discount factor for the
home firm r is f,lf : P"-'* (#)-" for s: t,t+I,t+2....
The first order condition with resoect to labor is:
^r
?T X,t
A)AX,t (2.22)
^f 
, is equal to the real
implies a price which is
which implies that the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (2.2I),,
marginal cost. The first order condition with respect to the price
set as a markup over nominal marginal cost:
Pt(r) 
- 
Vf Pr^f 
,
(2.23)
where the markup equals
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vr- ?Yfi,,
(o-L)Y*,, ft- E(ffiL\ - t)'] * n@1
with
r
Int*rY",r+r*
L
In symmetric equilibrittm, p1(r) : Px,t. Foreign firms solve a similar problem and law
of one price holds: Px,t: e1Pfrp Py*,t: e1P|*y
2.2.5 Production of final goods
Production of final non-tradable goods
There is a continuum of symmetric perfectly competitive home firms on the interval n 
€
[0, o) producing home final non-tradable good l/. The output of a representative firm at
time t is denoted by )',nr.l and is produced with the following linear technology:
YN,t 
= 
Ax,tLN,t, (2.24)
where 41,',1 is a productivity shock common to producers of home non-tradable good and
.Lry,1 is homogenous labor used in the production of home non-tradable good. Taking the
price of labor, W1tJ, as given, the firm chooses labor, Ly.1,to minimize its costs subject to
the production function. The first order condition for the firm is:
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RPu,t: ry, Q'25)' Atr.t
where u)N,t 
-: Yy i" real wage in the non-tradable sector and, RPx7,1 = + is the price of
good l/ in units of consumption basket. Foreign firms solve a similar problem.
Production of final tradable goods
There is a continuum of symmetric perfectly competitive home firms on the interval / e
[0, a) producing home final tradable good F with the following constant elasticity of sub-
stitution production function:
YF,t
e-1(xr). +(1 
-
(2.26)
where Ypp is the amount of home final tradable good produced by a representative firm at
time t. The home final tradable good I'is produced using two intermediate goods: a basket
X of home tradable differentiated intermediate goods and a basket X" of foreign tradable
differentiated intermediate goods. e ) 0 is the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign intermediate goods and 0 < .y < L is the share of home intermediate good in the
production of home final tradable good.
Baskets of home and foreign intermediate goods are defined as follows:
l-1
- 
l-vZ
L'
-D! 6il=] - j
le-drl 
,
J
x1= [t;) 
* 
1,"
e-r(xr("))T (2.27)
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x; ltar l,'G;(**))Ta*
where 0
tr* denote home and foreign varieties of the interme,Ciate
production function implies:
and
the
.l #t,
J
ntermediate
goods. The
(2.28)
goods and r
definition of
f ,^ r1-r /a \./n rl-t1 GpF,t: 
Lr t
and the definitions of the baskets of intermediate goods imply:
Px,t
l/ 1 \ pr li=Px*,t: l(=)/ (p1(r*))'-'dr*l ,L\l-a/ J" l
where P76 and Px* are the price indices of home and foreign baskets of intermediate goods
and p1(r) and p1(r") are the prices of varieties r and r*.
The representative firm's demands for baskets X and X* are:
x1 _ jlffi] -'yF,,, (2.2e)
and the demands for individual goods r and ** by the representative firm are:
X;- (2.30)
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xt(*)
x; (".)
Foreign producers solve a similar problem.
PF,t 
- 
€1Pfr.r, PF*,t 
- 
€1Pfr*.r.
Law of one price holds in
1
a
1: L-a
lwl 
-'x,,
(2.31)
(2.32)
final tradable sector:
I,P] -,X;lPx"J )
2.2.6 Goods and labor market clearing
Market clearing conditions are as follows. Non-tradable goods can be consumed by house-
holds and government:
Yv,1dn CN,tdtj + aGt, (2.33)
are consumed bywhere Gt denotes per capita government purchases.
home and foreign households:
Final tradable goods
YF,tdf : (2.34)
final tradable goods.
1," lr" cF,tdt + l"t ch,rd,i*
r
- Jo1,"
and intermediate
Markets clear for
goods are used in production of home and foreign
each variety tr:
Yrt,, : lo" xr(*)df + I"t x*,t(*)d,f*
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(2.35)
Labor market clearing requires:
L N,td'l +1,"
fa
J, Lx'tdr ' (2.36)
2.2.7 Government
The government is not productive and public spending falls on final non-tradable goods and
is denoted by G, which is per capita government consumption. The government finances its
consumption through lump-sum taxes imposed on consumers and the seigniorage revenue
and is required to balance its budget in every period:
PN,tGtdn
- 
Ml-') * (2.37)
The government conducts stabilization policy which is specified (in log-linear terms) as:
1,"
lr" Lx,tdi 
: 
Io" 
Lrv,tdn +
: 
lo" 
ptrldt + Ir" @l
-^-0r: fcopGDPt+€et, (2 38)
where s, : ffi, f cop is the feedback parameter on the GDP gap with respect to
the steady state, and {f is an exogenous shock to fiscal policy. Hats denote percentage
deviations from the steady state. The foreign fiscal policy is specified in a similar way.
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2.2.8 Central bank and monetary policy
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the new EU members can benefit from
joining the monetary union. In order to do so, I analyze three monetary regimes: a flexible
exchange rate regime, a fixed exchange rate regime and a monetary union. I evaluate
benefits or costs of joining the monetary union by comparing the monetary union to the
other two regimes. Both of the two regimes are relevant when studying the new EU members
since these countries have gone through several monetary
the Exchange Rate Mechanism most of the Central and
their exchange rate float. Some of them have already fixed
and participate in the ERM. Eventually, they will join the
arrangements. Prior to joining
Eastern European countries let
their exchange rate to the euro
monet ary union.
Fixed exchange rate
In the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, the home central bank issues home nominal
money and supports a fixed exchange rate.e This is in line with the requirement of the
membership in the Exchange Rate Mechanism prior to joining the monetary union.
The foreign central bank issues foreign nominal money. The foreign monetary policy is
endogenous and specified in terms of an interest rate rule which in log-linear terms equals:
ii*, 
- 
mfr; + *b p rft; + *b r r€nFi + €;*, (2.39)
where ml, mbpt, and m[o, are feedback parameters on the previous period interest rate,
nS"" Benigno et al. (2002) for details on how to fix the exchange rate.
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CPI inflation and GDP gap, respectively, and (i* is an exogenous shock to monetary
policy. Hats denote percentage deviations from the steady state and the interest rate and
the inflation rate are gross rates.
Flexible exchange rate
In the second scenario, both countries have a flexible exchanqe rate. The home central bank
follows the following interest rate rule:
-^-
- jt + mcprftt * r'ncopTnlt + muet + 
€T.Lt+t 
- 
TTL;', (2.40)
This interest rate rule allows the home central bank to respond to movements in the nominal
exchange rate. The foreign central bank again follows the rule in equation (2.39).
Monetary union
When the two countries constitute a monetary union, there is only one central bank which
issues a single currency and conducts a single monetary policy. fts monetary policy is
specified in terms of an interest rate rule that takes into account inflation and output of
both countries:10
f^-*1ir*t : mfit + mbprlaftt + (t 
- 
a)iil * *boe l"GoFr+ (1 - a)doFil + €f, (2.4r)
toThe EMU targets a
are each country's share
countries.
weighted average of the
of total consumption. I
harmonized index of consumer prices, where the weights
assume that the weights are the relative sizes of the two
7A
where u refers to the monetarv union. fn
described above differs in that consumers in
the case of the monetary union, the model
both countries trade one international bond
denominated in the single currency and prices in both countries are denominated in the
single currency as well.
2.3 Solution and parameterization of the model
The model cannot be solved analytically. Thus I find the rational expectations equilibrium
of the log-linearized approximation around the steady state.11
2.3.1 Parameterization
The benchmark calibration and the choice of parameter values is a s follows. The home
economy in this model represents the new EU members and the foreign economy is desig-
nated to be the EMU.12 Thus, the size of the home country relative to the foreign economy,
a, is set to 5 percent.l3 The discount factor, B, equals 0.99 which implies an annual real
interest rate of around 4 percent. In line with the literature, the inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution of consumption, o, is equal to 2. Following Laxton and Pesenti
(2003), the inverse of labor supply elasticity,Ty', is set to2.5. I assume a logarithmic utility
of the government consumption so that os: l.
The share of the home tradable consumption in the tradable consumption basket, c,.r,
and the share of the home intermediate good in production of final tradable goods, 1) are
11I employ the technique by Uhlig (1999).
t2Th" model is calibrated to the EMU and the Czech Republic's data.
l3The new members' share of GDP in the EU total GDP is around 5 percent.
7I
equal to a. The share of the tradable consumption in the consumption basket, rp, equals 55
percent as in Natalucci and Ravenna (2003).
The elasticity of substitution between the non-tradable and the tradable consumption,
p, is set to 0.5 as in Stockman and Tesar (1995) and the elasticity of substitution between
the home and the foreign tradable good consumption, 4, is set to 1.5. e is the elasticity of
substitution between the home and the foreign intermediate goods and is set to 0.5. The
last two parameters are taken from Natalucci and Ravenna (2003). d denotes the elasticity
of substitution among intermediate goods. I set I : 6 which is standard in the literature
and implies a markup of. L.2.ra The price adjustment cost parameter, K, is set to 77, as
estimated by Ireland (2001) for the US economy. All parameters for financial transaction
costs are set to 0.01, which is standard in the literature.
I first solve the model for historic fiscal and monetary policies. The steady state share
of the government purchases in GDP is calibrated to 18 percent. According to the data,
fiscal instruments follow an AR(1) process.ls The foreign monetary policy parameters for
the EMU are set as estimated by Smets and Wouters (2003). The degree of interest rate
smoothing, ml , is set to 0.95. The interest rate response to inflati on, ml p1 , equals 1.65 and
the interest rate response to GDP, mbop, is set to 0.14. I use the same parameters when f
consider the case of a monetarv union. There are no estimates of interest rate rules for the
new EU members. In the case of a flexible exchange rate regime in the home economy I set
m; and rncDp as in the foreign economy, mCeI equals to 2 and rn" is set to 0.5.
laMartins et al. (1996) estimate the average markup
countries. In the absence of an estimate for central and
estimate.
tus"" Chapter 1 for details on historic fiscal policies.
for manufacturing sector at I.2 for the OECD
Eastern European countries I use their markup
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2.4 The effects and transmission of shocks under different
monetary regimes
To understand the model's transmission mechanism and the implications of different mone-
tary regimes, I first present the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to a monetary
shock and a technology shock.16 I choose to analyze the impulse responses of the variables in
both economies to the foreign shocks because shocks originating the home economy almost
do not affect the large country.
2.4.L Foreign monetary shock
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 present impulse responses to a one-percent increase in the foreign mon-
etary shocklT which increases the foreign nominal interest rate. Solid lines represent the
impulse responses under a flexible exchange rate and dashed lines correspond to a fixed ex-
change rate arrangement in the home economy. The foreign variables respond to the foreign
monetary shock almost identically regardless of the monetary regime in the home economy.
This happens because the foreign central bank implements a Taylor type interest rate rule
regardless of the monetary policy in the home country and because the home economy is
relativelv small.
A positive foreign monetary shock increases the foreign nominal interest rate (not shown)
and the foreign real interest rate (which is in units of foreign consumption basket). Con-
16In Chapter 1 I analyze fiscal shocks in a similar model.ttTh" monetary shock is an iid shock.
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sequently, the foreign private consumption falls. The foreign country is relatively closedls
so that dynamics of the foreign GDP follow the dynamics of the foreign consumption. The
foreign CPI inflation decreases. The fall in the foreign consumption is due to a decrease in
the foreign tradable consumption while the foreign non-tradable consumption increases. A
lower demand for the foreign tradable goods reduces the production of the foreign final and
intermediate tradable goods and a higher demand for the non-tradable goods increases the
production of these goods.
In the case of a fixed exchange rate regime in the home economy, the real exchange
rate appreciates in the foreign economy which looses competitiveness. Since the home
economy has significant trade linkages with the foreign economy, the spillover effects are
contractionary on the home consumption and GDP. The effects of the foreign monetary
shock are qualitatively similar in the home economy as they are in the foreign country. The
real interest rate (in units of home consumption basket) increases and the CPI inflation
rate decreases. The home households borrow from abroad.
When the exchange rate is flexible in the home economy, the home real interest rate
increases by less in response to the foreign monetary shock. Consequently, the fall in the
home consumption is less pronounced. The home currency depreciates (not shown) and the
home CPI inflation responds much less to the shock compared to the fixed exchange rate
regime. The response of the real exchange rate is also smaller.
The third monetary regime that I consider is a monetary union between the two coun-
tries. I assume that a single central bank conducts its monetary policy by responding to a
18I otrly model trade linkages of the foreign economy with the small, home economy and abstract from the
rest of the world.
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weighted average of the CPI inflation and GDP where the weights are the relative sizes of
the economies. In this case, the variables (not shown) in both countries respond similarly
to the monetary shock as they do under a fixed exchange rate regime in the home economy.
2.4.2 Foreign technology shock
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present impulse responses to a one-percent increase in the foreign in-
termediate sector productivity. Again, I show the impulse responses for a flexible exchange
rate regime (solid line) and a fixed exchange rate regime in the home economy (dashed line).
A positive productivity shock in the foreign intermediate sector increases the output of
the foreign intermediate goods, reduces the labor supply, and increases the wage rate in this
sector. The increase in the productivity dominates the effect of higher wages so that the
marginal costs decrease. As a consequence, the relative price of the foreign intermediate
goods falls. The markup increases to preserve profitability and the dividends are higher.
This is reflected in an increase of the foreign share price
The productivity shock in the foreign intermediate sector transmits to other sectors in
the foreign economy and also to the home economy. The shock directly transmits to the
foreign final tradable goods firms, which use intermediate goods in their production. They
enjoy lower foreign input prices and therefore expand the production of the final tradable
goods. The relative prices of the foreign final tradable goods decrease and the quantity
demanded by home and foreign households increases. The foreign households also demand
more non-tradable goods which increases the labor demand and wages in the foreign non-
tradable sector. The foreign relative price of the non-tradable goods is consequently higher.
-t-to
At the same time the original shock transmits to the home economy. Under a fixed
exchange rate regime, the home final tradable sector expands for the same reason as the
foreign final tradable sector (the foreign inputs have a higher weight in the production of
the final tradable goods) and the home relative price of the final tradable goods decreases.
There is an initial boom in the home intermediate sector coming from a higher home and
foreign demand because both, the home and the foreign inputs are required in the produc-
tion of the final tradable goods. After the initial positive effect on the home intermediate
sector, the demand for the home inputs decreases (prices are higher at home). The labor
dynamics at home follorv the output dynamics in the home intermediate sector. A higher
demand for inputs initially results in a higher demand for the intermediate labor and higher
wages. Since labor is perfectly mobile between the two sectors, it flows to the intermediate
sector. Initially, the home non-tradable output declines but once the positive effect in the
intermediate sector is reversed, the labor in the intermediate sector is lower and the output
in the non-tradable sector expands. The home relative price of the non-tradable goods
increases.
As a consequence of a positive productivity shock in the foreign intermediate sector the
home and the foreign GDP and private consumptions expand. The foreign CPI inflation
almost does not responds due to the opposite dynamics of prices of tradable and non-
tradable goods, while the home CPI inflation increases because the prices of tradable and
non-tradable goods both increase. As a result, the real exchange rate, which is defined as
REt 
- $, declines (nominal exchange rate is fixed). The home households accumulate
foreign bonds because the shock results in a higher expansion in the home country.
As in the case of the foreign monetary shock, the home real interest rate (not shown)
76
responds much less to the shock under a flexible exchange rate regime. The home currency
appreciates (not shown) and the home CPI inflation responds much less to the shock com-
pared to the fixed exchange rate regime. The response of the real exchange rate is also
smaller. When the two countries constitute a monetary union, both countries' variables
(not shown) behave similarly as under a fixed exchange rate regime in the home economy.
2.4.3 Dynamic properties of the model and the volatility of macroeco-
nomic variables under different monetary regimes
In this section I investigate how the model behaves when the two economies are hit by
all shocks considered. In order to do so I make some assumption about the stochastic
processes. Productivity, preference and fiscal shocks follow AR(1) processes. I set the
persistence parameters of all productivity shocks to 0.9. The productivity shocks between
different sectors within a country are perfectly correlated as in Natalucci and Ravenna
(2003) and Laxton and Pesenti (2003). All other shocks are independent ofeach other. The
persistence parameters of the preference shocks, the labor disutility shocks, the shocks to
shifts in preferences between the non-tradable and the tradable goods, and the fiscal shocks
are set to 0.7,0.9, 0.9 and 0.9, respectively. The monetary shocks are iid processes. I choose
the standard deviations of the shocks to match some of the moments of the macroeconomic
variables given historic monetary and fiscal policies and the baseline parameter values.le
The details on the stochastic processes are in Table 2.2.
The second moments of the model and the values from the data are presented in Table
leMo*ents are matched for a fixed exchange rate regime in the home country.
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2.3. The model generates almost twice as much variability in GDP in the new EU members
compared to the Euro Area and the absolute values of standard deviations are consistent
with the variability in the historic data. For the Czech Republic, the model performs well
volatile than GDP itself. However,in the sense that all of the GDP components are more
the government expenditure is more volatile in the model. The CPI inflation rate is more
volatile and the nominal interest rate is less volatile than in the data. This could be due
to the monetary regime that I assume for the smaller economy in the model. In order to
mimic current arrangement of the institutions in the new EU member states and to keep
the strategic games among policymakers as simple as possible, I assume that the smaller
economy supports a fixed exchange rate regime. However, historic moments are based on a
monetary regime that is not a fixed exchange rate regime.
For the Euro Area. the inflation and the interest rates are less variable in the model
because of the assumption of an inflation-targeting regime, which is similar to the model
properties of Laxton and Pesenti (2003). While data suggest less variability of the GDP
components than that of the GDP for the Euro Area, the model generates about the same
volatility for each of them.2o
Before discussing the optimal policy rules I analyze the volatility of some variables given
the calibrated model and historic policy rules for three different monetary regimes in the
home economy. Table 2.4 presents the standard deviations of the GDP, the CPI inflation
rate, the real interest rate, the real exchange rate, and the nominal interest rate. The
numbers reflect some of the findings that were evident from the impulse responses. The
2oA more detailed explanation of the model properties may be found in Chapter 1. However, keep in mind
that the model in this Chapter and the model in Chapter 1 are not the same.
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fixed exchange rate regime amplifies output and inflation volatility relative to the flexible
exchange rate. This result is similar to Gali and Monacelli (forthcoming) while Devereux
(2002) obtains a similar result for output volatility but not inflation volatility. The real
exchange rate is more volatile under the fixed exchange rate regime, which is contrary to
Gali and Monacelli (forthcoming) and Devereux (2002). When the two countries constitute
a monetary union, home variables behave similarly as they do under a fixed exchange rate
regime but are less volatile when compared to the fixed exchange rate regime.
I perform some sensitivity analysis with respect to the choice of the parameter values in
the home interest rate rule under the flexible exchange rate regime in the home economy.
The analysis confi.rms the findings from the benchmark calibration. The flexible exchange
rate regime still produces the lowest volatility of the home variables. The same holds when I
allow for endogenous fiscal policy and when f increase the relative size of the home economy.
The volatility ranking is preserved for a value of 400 for rc, which measures price rigidity.2l
2.5 l)esign of monetary and fiscal policies
So far I have assumed that fiscal and monetary policies are conducted by use of historic
empirical rules. Such specification is useful because it helps us understand how shocks are
transmitted to macroeconomic variables and provides basis for empirical evaluation of the
underlying model.
In this section I turn to the optimal monetary and fiscal policies22 and analyze how
2llaxton and Pesenti (2003) set the parameter which measures price stickiness to 400 for the Czech
Republic.
22Due to the structure of the model, I cannot solve for fully optimal policies. In what follows, optimal policy
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different monetary regimes in the new EU members perform in welfare terms. I assume that
policymakers choose stabilization policy i.e. reaction parameters in their policy rules, to
maximize the unconditional expectation of households' welfare and that they can commit to
the rules. Given the class of rules considered, such fiscal and monetary policies are optimal.
I use numeric optimization to solve for the optimal policies. The welfare function is derived
as a second-order Taylor approximation to the utility function and can be expressed, after
omitting irrelevant terms, in each period t as:23
1 _.t 
-^ 
2L 1 
-t 
t"t, 1 
-1 -6wt : 
-;oeL-o ror@) - ;ltTr+'i' ua,r(ir) *"r"r-og uar(Gr), (2.42)
where C, L, and G are the steady state values of consumption, labor and government
purchases and hats denote percentage deviations from the steady state.
The definitions of the strategic games among policymakers are as follows. Under a fixed
exchange rate regime in the home country the home government, the foreign government and
the foreign central bank choose their feedback parameters in a non-cooperative fashion. The
home government chooses its feedback parameter to maximize home households' welfare and
the foreign government and central bank choose (in a non-cooperative way) their feedback
parameters to maximize foreign households' welfare. The home central bank supports the
fixed exchange rate.
refers to optimal policy within the class of rules specified in the model. Gali and Monacelli (forthcoming)
show in a simpler model than mine that domestic inflation targeting is optimal for a small open economy but
the welfare losses associated with the CPI inflation targeting and an exchange rate peg are small. Benigno
(2003) shows that targeting a weighted average of the harmonized index of consumer prices is optimal in a
currency union if the two regions have the same degree of nominal rigidities. I assume the same degree of
nominal rigidities. Finally, Beetsma and Jensen (2002) show that a class of fiscal rules which I use perform
well in their model. However, one should be cautious since my model differs significantly from the models
mentioned above.
23I assnme that real monev balances do not matter for welfare as common in the literature.
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Under a flexible exchange rate regime in the home country there are four players and
they all choose their feedback parameters in a non-cooperative way. Again, the home
policymakers maximize home households' welfare and the foreign policymakers maximize
foreign households' welfare. When the two countries constitute a monetary union, there are
two governments and only one single central bank. The three players again choose their
feedback parameters in a non-cooperative fashion. The home government maximizes home
and the foreign government maximizes foreign welfare. However, the single central bank
chooses its policy parameters to maximize a joint welfare function. I assume that the joint
welfa,re function is a weighted average of the home and the foreign welfare and that the
weights correspond to the relative sizes of the countries. In each case all policymakers act
simultaneouslv.
2.5.L Optimal monetary and fiscal policies
Table 2.1 presents optimal monetary and fiscal reaction coefficients to GDP gap, CPI infla-
tion, and the nominal exchange rate and the associated welfare losses for the three monetary
arrangements in the home economy.
Result 2.L Optimal monetary and fiscal poli,ci,es are countercycli,cal.
Under a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime in the home economy it is optimal for
the foreign central bank and government to respond strongly to the output gap and this is
consistent with a less aggressive home fiscal policy under a fixed exchange rate regime and
Iess aggressive home monetary and fiscal policies under a flexible exchange rate regime. The
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Table 2.1: Optimal Feedback Paramaters and the Associated Welfare Losses
Fixed Exchange Rate Flexible Exchange Rate Monetary Union
f&op
mbpr
mbop
f cop
-8.36
2.26
30.5
-4.LL
fbW
mbpr
mbpp
f cop
mcpt
rncop
ffie
-8.06
2.34
30.0
-2.80
L.82
4.45
0.03
f &op _1.56
mbpr 8.36
mbnp 28.9
f cop _2.LA
L
L"
23.74
L.28
L
L*
9.59
L.26
L
L*
17.08
1.38
home country benefits from stabilization policy of the foreign country because it is a small
open economy with strong trade links to the foreign country. When foreign policymakers
stabilize their own economy they also reduce the volatility in the home country.
In the case of a monetary union, a single central bank responds strongly to the weighted
average of the output gaps as well as the CPI inflation rates and the foreign government
responds much less to foreign output gap compared to the cases with a sovereign foreign
central bank. Even though it is optimal that the central bank takes on a larger stabilization
role than the governments, there is a role for fiscal stabilization in the monetary union.
This result and the magnitude of the fiscal parameters are in line with Beetsma and Jensen
(2002) who augment the model of Benigno (2004) with fiscal policy.2a
Result 2.2 Comparing fined and fl,eri,ble erchange rate regimes.
Foreign monetary and fiscal policies are almost the same regardless of the monetary
regime in the home economy (either a fixed or a flexible exchange rate regime). This is true
because I assume that foreign fiscal and monetary policy are specified in the same way in
'nwhett considering simple policy rules based on output gaps as opposed to consumption gaps, Beetsma
and Jensen (2002) take the monetary policy as constant.
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both cases and because the home economy is too small to significantly affect the variables
in the larger foreign economy.
The response of the home government under a fixed exchange rate regime is stronger
compared to a flexible exchange rate arrangement since in this case the home government is
the only policymaker who directly stabilizes the home economy. Under a flexible exchange
rate regime the home central bank takes on a larger role in stabilizing home output gap. It
is interesting to notice that there is almost no need for the home central bank to respond
to the nominal exchange rate, i.e. the nominal exchange rate stabilization is not important
in this setup. In welfare terms, a flexible exchange rate regime dominates a fixed exchange
rate regime.
The results in this Chapter are consistent with the other studies in the literature which
use a similar framework. Devereux (2002) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2002) find that
based on a volatility criterion flexible exchange rates are preferable to a fixed exchange
rate regime in the new EU members. Gali and Monacelli (forthcoming) and Devereux et al.
(2004) conduct welfare analysis and conclude that a flexible exchange rate is always superior
to a fixed exchange rate regime. The same can be inferred from Ghironi and Rebucci (2003)
who find that a Taylor rule is preferred to a currency board (a policy rule that implements
a fixed exchange rate is consistent with the currency board).
Result 2.3 The welfare-based ranleing of the monetary regi,mes in the home country is
as follows: Home households prefer a fl,erible erchange rate regime to a monetary union
and a monetary union to a fned erchange rate regime.
Flexible exchange rate vs. fixed exchange rate: A flexible exchange rate regime is
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preferred to a fixed exchange rate regime because under a fixed exchange rate regime there
is no home monetary policy available to stabilize the home country. Thus, home private
consumption, home labor effort, and home government consumption are less volatile under
a flexible exchange rate regime. Home welfare is thus higher when the home central bank
has a stabilization role as opposed to supporting a fixed exchange rate.
Monetary'union vs. fixed exchange rate: The single central bank pursues its monetary
policy in a way that takes into account both countries. Therefore, the home country benefits
from the single central bank's stabilization while there is no stabilization role for the home
central bank when it supports a fixed exchange rate. As under a flexible exchange rate
regime, home private consumption, labor effort, and government purchases are less volatile
in a monetary union than under a fixed exchange rate regime. Home households' welfare is
thus higher in a monetary union.
Flexible exchange rate vs. monetary union: Under a flexible exchange rate regime the
home central bank directly stabilizes the home economy while in a monetary union a single
central bank takes into account a weighted average of both counties' inflation rates and
output. Thus, shocks that affect the home economy are best absorbed when the home
country has a sovereign monetary policy. All variables that enter the utility function are
less volatile under a flexible exchange rate regime compared to a monetary union and home
welfare is higher under a flexible exchange rate regime.
Result 2.4 Foreign households prefer a fl,eri,ble erchange rate reg'ime to a monetary
un'ion.
I only consider two monetary regimes for the foreign economy, a flexible exchange rate
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regime and a monetary union with the home economy. The choice of a fixed or a flexible
exchange rate regime in the home country has a very limited effect on the larger foreign
economy. However, foreign households prefer the case in which the home economy has
a flexible exchange rate regime. In a flexible exchange rate regime, most of the home
economy's variables are less volatile and even though the spillover effects on the foreign
economy are very small, the larger foreign economy enjoys some benefits from a flexible
exchange rate in the home country.
Foreign private consumption is less volatile under a flexible exchange rate regime in the
foreign economy than in a monetary union. Foreign labor effort and government purchases
are more volatile under a flexible exchange rate but the effect of foreign private consumption
dominates and thus foreign welfare is higher under a flexible exchange rate regime.
Result 2.5 Benefi,ts from a monetary un'i,on.
Even though the results show that a monetary union between the home and the foreign
country is not desirable when compared to a flexible exchange rate regime, there are some
benefits brought by a monetary union. The home as well as the foreign CPI inflation rates
are least volatile in a monetary union. The single central bank is thus more successful in
stabilizing inflation than national monetary policies. At the same time, the nominal interest
rates and the fiscal i: / R+*1) are also less volatile in the monetary union.nstruments \9t: -Gu., /
2.5.2 Sensitivity analysis
I conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to the weights in the single central bank's
joint welfare function in a monetary union. In the benchmark parameterization I assume
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that the weights correspond to the relative sizes of the economies. Here instead, I set the
weights to be equal to one half for both countries. The qualitative results stay the same
and the ranking of the monetary regimes does not change. It is interesting to note, but
not surprising, that the welfare of home households increases and welfare of the foreign
households decreases compared to the case where the weights in the joint welfare function
equal to the relative sizes of the countries.
2.6 Conclusions
In this Chapter I investigate whether Central and Eastern European countries'(new EU
members) can benefit from joining the EMU. I build a two-country model which is tailored
to mimic the new EU members and the euro currency area and compare households' welfare
under three different monetary regimes in the new EU countries: a fixed exchange rate
regime, a flexible exchange rate regime and a monetary union. I find that welfare is highest
under a flexible exchange rate regime followed by a monetary union and a fixed exchange
rate regime.
The results I presented in this Chapter are conditional on the model specification I used.
It should be noticed that there are several benefits that a monetarv union can offer but I
do not take into account or they are not reflected in the welfare function. One example are
long-run benefits from greater trade integration which may dominate the costs of loosing
monetary sovereignty. It would thus be of interest to take into account more dimensions of
costs and benefits of joining a monetary union. I leave this issue open for future research.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Foreign household j*'s budget constraint is:
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As opposed to home households, foreign consumers buy and trade shares in home and
foreign intermediate sector firms and do not hold home bonds. Bf denotes foreign bonds
held by foreign consumers, ^9fl are shares in foreign fi.rm r* held by a foreign consumer
entering period t and Sf I are shares in home firm r held by a foreign consumer entering
period t. The price of shares of foreign firm r* is denoted by Vf. and the price of shares of
home firm r is denoted by Vf . Foreign households receive dividends on foreign and home
shares, Df" and Df , respectively.
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Table 2.2: Assumptions About Stochastic Processes
Standard Deviation Persistence Parameter
Home Foreign Home Foreign
Productivity
Marginal Utility of Consumption
Marginal Disutility of Labor
Preference Shifter
Government/GDP
Interest Rate
0.0200
0.0387
0.0100
0.0089
0.0032
0.0032
0.0087
0.0224
0.0032
0.0032
0.0010
0.0032
0.9
0.7
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.7
0.9
0.9
0.9
Table 2.3: Macroeconomic Variability of the Czech Republic and the Euro Area
Czech Republic Euro Area
Model Historic Model Historic
Standard deviation (%)
Real GDP
Consumption
Government Expenditure
CPI Inflation
Short-Term Interest Rate
Employment
Real Exchange Rate
1.98
2.72
6.02
2.55
0.37
0.91
3.24
2.0*
2.29
2.6*
1.08
0.47
3.1
1.01
r.02
1.09
0.26
0.36
0.63
1.0*
0.9*
0.6*
0.56
0.98
1.16
Note: The model's variables are detrended with HP filter. Estimates of historic standard
deviations that are
of estimates for the
taken from Laxton and Pesenti (2003) are marked by a star. The rest
Czech Republic are taken from Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) and for
the Euro Area they are taken from Fagan et al. (2001). Data in Laxton and Pesenti (2003)
are detrended with HP filter using the smoothness parameter of 1600. The time period for
the Euro Area data is from 1970Q1 to 2002Q4 and for the Czech Republic from 1,973Q1
to 2002Q4. In Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) all series are logged (except for interest and
inflation rates) and HP filtered. Data are per capita and seasonally adjusted. Time span
for the Czech Republic is 1994Q1 to 2003Q1. In Fagan et al. (forthcoming), variables are
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expressed in per capita terms and logged (except for inflation and interest rates). They are
seasonally adjusted and HP filtered.
Table 2.4: Volatility of Selected Home Variables under Different Monetary Regimes
Fixed Ex. Rate Flexible Ex. Rate Monetary Union
Standard deviation (%)
GDP
CPI Inflation
Real Interest Rate
Real Exchange Rate
Nominal Interest Rate
1.986
2.556
2.604
3.246
0.373
T.9T7
0.625
0.385
2.948
0.549
1.978
2.439
2.472
3.222
0.355
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Chrpter 3
Fiscal Policy Cooperation in the
EMT]
3.1 Introduction
Many studies have analyzed the need for fiscal policy cooperation in a monetary union. This
literature has been inspired by the idea and later the launch of a single currency shared by
some European Union (EU) members. However, the literature usually addresses the issue
of fiscal policy cooperation given a simple model in which countries are arbitrary. In this
Chapter I investigate whether there are welfare gains from fiscal policy cooperation in the
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) given a model that better incorporates
the features of current as well as future EMU members.
Even though the new EU members do not yet participate in the monetary union they
will have to join it once they have met the entry criteria. I thus choose to analyze the need
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for fiscal policy cooperation between the following two groups of countries in the EMU, the
current euro area and the new EU members which will join the EMU in the near future.
I build a two-country model where the larger (foreign) country represents current EMU
members (incumbents) and the smaller (home) economy represents the countries that will
join the EMU in the near future. I assume that the two countries constitute a monetary
union. Each country has a government but they share a single central bank. The three
policymakers conduct stabilization policy by use of policy rules. When governments co-
operate on fiscal policies, each government chooses the response parameter in its policy
rule to maximize the unconditional expectation of a weighted average of home and foreign
households' utility fioint welfare), taking the behavior of the central bank as given. The
central bank chooses its response parameters to maximize the unconditional expectation of
the joint welfare, taking the behavior of the governments as given. In a non-cooperative
game, the central bank still maximizes the joint welfare (since the two countries constitute
a monetary union) and the governments maximize its own households' welfare. Each player
takes the actions of the other two players as given and all players act simultaneously.
The results show that the foreign economy is better off when the governments coop-
erate their fiscal policies while the home country is indifferent between the two equilibria.
This result differs from Dixit and Lambertini (200L, 2003) and Eichengreen and Ghironi
(2002) who show that there is no need for fiscal cooperation in a monetary union when all
policymakers agree on their goals.l The result also differs from the results in Chapter 1.
There I assume that the two countries each have a national central bank and both countries
'In my model all policymakers maximize the same objective function (joint welfare) when the governments
cooperate. This follows by construction of the model.
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are better off when the governments do not cooperate. However, my conclusions in this
paper resemble Lombardo and Sutherland (2003) who show that fiscal policy cooperation
is beneficial if also monetary policies are set cooperatively.2
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a two-country model
of the EMU. In section 3 I describe the solution method and the selection of parameters. In
Section 4 I present the transmission mechanism and the dynamic properties of the model.
I explain the results about fiscal policy cooperation is Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 A general equilibrium model of the European union
3.2.L Overview of the economic environment
The model builds on the model from Chapter 1. However, in this paper I assume that
the new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe participate in the monetary union.
While this is currently not the case, the new EU members will have to join the EMU. The
model mimics in particular the structure of the new EU members. First, it incorporates
the presence of foreign ownership of the firms in Central and Eastern Europe which has
arisen as a consequence of foreign financing of caching up with the rest of the EU. This
feature was first introduced in Chapter 1. Second, intermediate goods represent a substan-
tial part of imports of these countries and contribute to the dynamics of macroeconomic
variables. Third, domestic tradable goods are exported and consumed by domestic house-
holds. Fourth, non-tradable sector is important and most of the government purchases are
2More related studies can be found in Chapter 1.
96
on non-tradable goods. Taking aII of the above into consideration provides more flexibil-
ity to match the data and more realistic interdependencies between Central and Eastern
European countries and the incumbent EU members.
The theoretical framework that I use for mv analvsis is a micro.founded dvnamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium model.
incumbent EU members and the
of the EU. In each country there
The two countries constitute a
variables are indexed bv a star.
Households in both countries are infinitely lived and have preferences over consumption,
real money balances, labor supply, and government purchases.
domestic final non-tradable goods, domestic final tradable goods
goods. Each household supplies homogenous labor to domestic
tradable goods and to domestic firms producing intermediate
The foreign country in the model is designated to fit the
home country represents an aggregate of the new members
are households, firms, and a fiscal authority (government).
monetary union and have a single central bank. Foreign
Each household consumes
and imported final tradable
firms producing final non-
tradable goods. Labor is
perfectly mobile between the sectors within a country. Labor market is perfectly competitive
and labor is immobile internationallv. Households trade a short-term nominal bond which
is denominated in the single currency.
The ownership structure of the firms and the equity share trade is as follows: in all the
cases all but intermediate sector firms are locally-owned, i.e. home households own home
firms and foreign households own foreign firms. Since the presence of foreign ownership in
the new EU countries is substantial, I assume that owners of home and foreign intermediate
firms are foreign households who trade home and foreign equity shares and receive dividends
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from home and foreign intermediate sector firms.3
Each country produces three types of goods: final non-tradable goods, final tradable
goods and a continuum of differentiated intermediate tradable goods. Final non-tradable
goods are produced by perfectly competitive firms using domestic labor as input. Final
non-tradable goods can be consumed by households and by the government. The firms
which produce the final tradable goods operate in a perfectly competitive environment.
Their goods are produced by combining domestic and imported intermediate goods and
are used for private consumption. Each intermediate tradable good is produced by a single
firm in a monopolistically competitive environment. The input used in production of each
intermediate good is domestic labor. The intermediate goods are used in the production of
the final tradable good. In the intermediate sector, there are nominal rigidities in the form
of a quadratic cost of price adjustment.
Government conducts stabilization fiscal policy. Government spending falls on the final
non-tradable good and is financed through lump-sum tax revenues and seigniorage. The
single central bank conducts monetary policy by employing an interest rate rule.
3.2.2 l{ouseholds and their trading opportunities
Utility function
Home consumer 7's utility function has the following form:
3The sector that is exclusively
not an extreme assumption about
foreign-owned is only one out of three sectors.
the extent of foreign presence.
This assumption is thus
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oo(4 
= 
EtDpo
,i-0
f r / .: \P'-r
lrt - p,)i (rk,,)T + ( p,)i
L
, (3. 1)
(3.2)
where labor supply equals Lt : Lw,t + Lx,t, and labor is homogenous and perfectly mobile
between the sectors within the country, C1 is the consumption basket, P1 is consumption
price index, M1 are nominal money balances, and G1 are government purchases. o ) 0,
os> 0,X20, O> 0,rb > 0. B is the discount factor, ] is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of private consumption, fi is the elasticity of substitution of real money balances
and fr is labor supply elasticity. Agi is a preference shock and A7,1is a shock to labor
disutility. Home consumers are indexed by j e [0, a) and a is the relative size of the
home country. Foreign households' utility function is similar to the home one and foreign
households are indexed by j" e la,Ll.
Intra-temporal allocation of consumption
Total consumption, Ci, is a composite index of non-tradable and tradable consumption
baskets, CJ*,, and, CtT,r, r"rp"ctively:
(t+,,)*]ci
p
1t'-r
where 0 1 gt ( 1 is the share of tradable consumption in the consumption basket and
p, > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between non-tradable and tradable consumption. The
(log of) tradable goods' weight, cpr, is subject to an autocorrelated disturbance term around
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the steady state mean. This shock represents shifts in
non-tradable to tradable goods Ck is a basket of final
perfectly competitive firms.
Consumption index of tradable goods is defined as:
+(1 (t'r.
cb,r: etl+1-' ,tLn) v ';
home residents' preferences from
non-tradable goods produced by
I r / \n-L
ctr,r: lr; lch,) n,L \+1#,t) I ,- r)+ (3.3)
where 0 I w ( 1 is the share of home tradable consumption and r7 > 0 is the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign tradable good. consumption. Cr, and Ct . *.
baskets of home and foreign final tradable goods also produced by perfectly competitive
firms.
The definitions of consumption preferences imply:
P1: |.f t - pt) (PN,r)t-' * pt(Pr,r)t-'] r-t" ,L
IPr,t- [, f PF,t)t-, + (t - u) (Pe*,t)t-nl - ,
where P1,r and P7 are the prices of non-tradable and tradable consumption baskets, respec-
tively, and Pp and Pp. are the prices of home and foreign baskets of final tradable goods,
respectively.
The demands for baskets Cr, and Cfu are:
(3 4)
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f pw,r1_, ni(1 
- e) Llfl c,,
and the demands for home and foreign baskets of final tradable goods are:
I Pr,rl-qald c*,,,
(1 
-,) lE:] 
-'ct,r
Foreign households solve a similar problem.
f nter-temporal opt irnizat ion
The budget constraint for household 7 in the home country is:
r-j
-N,t
r-j
" F,,t
rt3uF*rt
(3.5)
(3.6)
(3.7)
(3.8)
ncl + nrl
* PtTCr!
- 
.,,
^/r-t + Brt+r + ,,€u ( ol \ 
2
*7(,?,) +
1+ (1 + ir)Bt' *Wx,rLk,r* Wx,tLk,,
Home household j consumes, CJ1 , pays net lump-sum taxes, T!, and receives wage income.
Household j holds money, M!, and a bond, B, denominated in the single currency, where
Ai*ri"the stock of bonds held by household j entering period t*1. The short-term nominal
interest rates f1 is paid at the beginning of period t and is known at time t 
- 
1. There are
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intermediation costs for households entering the international bond market.4. The revenue
from the intermediation is rebated to the home consumers as a lump-sum transaction cost
,t
transfer, f Cfi .5 In equilibrium, the rebate equals TCfi : €+ (9fu \ .2 \n )'
Each household chooses labor supply, bond and money holdings, and consumption path
to maximize expected utility (3.1) subject to the budget constraint (3.8). The first order
conditions with respect to labor are:
AL,t ('t)r
where u)N,t 
- ry and u)x,t-
intermediate sector, respectively.
are:
AC,,
Ab,,
. /_r\_6)Ac,t \o,t )
real wages in the
order conditions
(3.e)
final non-tradable sector and
with respect to bond holdings
lDN,t : ?IX,t
ry are
The first
(nj \-"1
\vr+l/ |('t) -"[r+e"(+)] : P G* it+r' 7-' l- Pt)ErlilAc,t+t (3.10)
(3.11)
Unlike home households, foreign households also trade equity shares in home and foreign
intermediate sector firms. Their budget constraint is presented in the Appendix. The first
order conditions with respect to home and foreign shares are:
(nfir+uffr) o.(tl.)-" : oEtl*[' t+r (rt;,) 
-"] 
,vf.
aTh" interm"diation costs are introduced to guarantee that net bond positions follow a stationary process
and economies converge asymptotically to a steady state. See Schmitt-Groh6 and Uribe (2003) on this and
other approaches on how to pin down the steday state values of bonds.
5I assome that intermediaries are perfectly competitive and owned by local households.
c,t+r
r02
Ab,,
The market clearing conditions for home and foreign equity shares are:
ldr,
Ldr*
(tt;,)-"] ?(tl.)-" : oEtl*
L' r+1
(nf*, +v&r) 
or_
W nc't+7 (3.12)
(3.13)
(3.14)
(3.15)
where V' and V" denote the price of shares in home intermediate firm r and the price of
equity shares in foreign intermediate firm r*, respectively. D" and D"' are dividends paid
by home and foreign firms r and ff*, respectively.
3.2.3 Asset market clearing
In equilibrium, households and firms are symmetric so that Brt+r: Br*r, Bili: Bi+r and
1; si'1*ra" : 
"Si,l+t = s*,'+1 and f; s{rlia".: (1 - ,)Sk:l; = Sl,r+r. S?'i. ur" equity
share holdings of foreign household j* in home firm r and ,9f.''. are equity share holdings
of foreign household j* in foreign firm r*. Market clearing conditions for the home and
foreign bond are:
Bf+rdtj* 
- 
0.Ir" Bt+td,i + l"'
Irt s*"t*l d'j* 
: 
Io"
L' si''+r d'j* - l,t
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3.2.4 Intermediate goods sector and its ownership structure
The home intermediate good r 
€ [0, a) is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm
that uses the following linear technology:
Yrt,t 
= 
Ax,tLk,t, (3.16)
where Ay,1 is productivity shock common to all producers and L'y,, is homogenous labor
used in the production of good r. The firms producing intermediate goods face nominal
rigidities. Following Rotemberg (1982), the nominal rigidities are in the form of a quadratic
cost of price adjustment.
The home frrm r maximizes the present discounted value of the dividends, df,,
max
{p"(t),Lk,"} (3.17)
subject to
E1 (t"'q)
and
Since foreign households own
home firm r is Og 
- 
p'4*
sector firms, the
+ 1 ,t + 2... and
(3.18)
(3.19)
discount factor for the
r is the tax rate on the
Yi:, 
-YP,::Yrt,,.
home intermediate
@) -" for s- t,t
L04
fi.rmts revenues.
The first order condition with respect to labor is:
\ 
" 
?rx,t
a7 
- A*r'
which implies that the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (3.19),
marginal cost. The first order condition with respect to the price
set as a markup over nominal marginal cost:
pt(r) 
- 
vf Pt\f 
,
where the markup equals
(3.20)
^f 
, is equal to the real
implies a price which is
(3.21)
?Yrt,,
vT-
(0 
- 
L)Y*,, [t
l-n
lnr*tYrt,r+ril
L
* rc@1
with
o,=Yn,,ffi(ffi-') 
-81
In symmetric equilibrium, p1(r) : Pxi. Foreign firms solve a similar problem.
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3.2.5 Production of final goods
Production of final non-tradable goods
There is a continuum of symmetric perfectly competitive home firms on the interval n 
€
[0, a) producing home final non-tradable good l[. The output of a representative firm at
time t is denoted by Yx., and is produced with the following linear technology:
YN,t 
= 
AN,tLN,t, (3.22)
where A7,7,1is a productivity shock common to producers of home non-tradable good and
-L1,r,1 is homogenous labor used in the production of home non-tradable good. Taking the
price of labor, W7{, as given, the firm chooses labor, L111,to minimize its costs subject to
the production function. The first order condition for the firm is:
(3.23)
where uN,t z ff i" real wage in the non-tradable sector and RP1g,; = '# is the price of
good I/ in units of consumption basket. Foreign firms solve a similar problem.
Production of final tradable goods
u N,tRPN,I: fr,,
There is a continuum of svmmetric
[0, o) producing home final tradable
stitution production function:
perfectly competitive home firms on the interval f €
good F with the following constant elasticity of sub-
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YF,t j
lr r tt | ..d-, .l-Y*-lr - | l(Xi1r.77-z-a", ,',t 
- l\r _,/ ro I 
where 0 > 1, denotes the elasticity of substitution among intermed
r* denote home and foreign varieties of the intermediate goods.
production function implies:
f- r €-1 1
Lrr(x') ' +(1 -i);
x1 
= [f*l 
r 
I" (X,(*))+ d")^ ,
lt P*,r)r-'+ (t
: [(*) 1," @,('))'-'d']* ,
e-Il 
-
(x:'1 ? l'-'\-^r/ J )
-^D@x*,r)t-'] *
(3.24)
where Y4t is the amount of home final tradable good produced by a representative firm at
time t. The home final tradable good F is produced using two intermediate goods: a basket
X of home tradable differentiated intermediate goods and a basket X* of. foreign tradable
differentiated intermediate goods. e > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign intermediate goods and 0 I 1 1 1 is the share of home intermediate good in the
production of home final tradable good.
Baskets of home and foreign intermediate goods are defined as follows:
(3.25)
(3.26)
and
the
iate
The
goods and r
definition of
PF,t:
and the definitions of the baskets of intermediate goods imply:
PX,t
r07
Px*,t:[(*)
where P76 and Py* o"re the price indices of home and foreign baskets of intermediate goods
and p1(r) and p1(r*) are the prices of varieties r and r*.
The representative firm's demands for baskets X and X* are:
x1 
-^tlffi] -'YF,t, (3.27)
xi:(r _ry) lH]-, r,,,
and the demands for individual goods r and r* by the representative firm are:
(3.28)
(3.2e)Xr(r) lwl 
-'x,,
x; (".) I,P] -,X;
L Px",t l
1
a
1: L-a (3.30)
Foreign producers solve a similar problem.
3.2.6 Goods and labor market clearing
Market clearing conditions are as follows. Non-tradable goods can be consumed by house-
holds and governmentl
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Y1r7,1dn CN,tej + aGt.
Final tradable goods are consumed by home and foreign households:
r
- Jo1,"
1,"
(3.31)
Yr,tdf
in production of home and foreign
cF,tdi + I,t ch,rdi* (3.32)
final tradable goods.and intermediate goods are used
Markets clear for each varietv tr:
fa srYrt.r- | Xr@)df + | x*,t(")d,f., Jo Jo
Labor market clearing requires:
(3.33)
Lw,,tdj Lx,tdj Lrv,tdn * Lx,tdr. (3.34)
3.2.7 Fiscal and monetary policy
Government and fiscal policy
The government is not productive and public spending falls on final non-tradable goods and
is denoted by G, which is per capita government consumption. The government finances its
consumption through lump-sum taxes imposed on consumers and the seigniorage revenue
and is required to balance its budget in every period:
1,"
r
lo
* Io"1,"
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PN,tGtdn PrTldtj +
- 
Ml-') * (3.35)
The government conducts stabilization policy which is specified (in log-linear terms) as:
0r: fcopGDPt+€st,
1,"@t1,"
(3.36)
where o, : ffi, fcop is the feedback parameter on the GDP gap with respect to
the steady state, and {f is an exogenous shock to fiscal policy. Hats denote percentage
deviations from the steady state. The foreign fiscal policy is specified in a similar way.
Central bank and monetary policy
The two countries constitute a monetary union and there is onlv one central bank which
issues a single currency and conducts a single monetary policy. Its monetary policy is
specified in terms of an interest rate rule that takes into account inflation and output of
both countries:o
ir*, : mit + rmcpr laftt + (L - a)ft;l t mcoe l"dDFr+ (1 - qd6F;l + €T. (3.37)
6The EMU targets a
are each country's share
countries.
weighted average of the
of total consumption. I
harmonized index of consumer prices, where the weights
assume that the weights are the relative sizes of the two
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3.3 Solution and parameterization of the model
3.3.1 Solution of the model and the steady state
Variables are expressed in real aggregate per capita terms. The model cannot be solved
analytically. Thus I find the rational expectations equilibrium of the log-linearized ap-
proximation around the steady state. I employ the solution method for solving nonlinear
dynamic discrete-time stochastic models provided by Uhlig (1999) and find the recursive
equilibrium law of motion using the method of undetermined coefficients.
3.3.2 Parameterization
The home economy in this model represents the new EU members and the foreign economy
represents the incumbent EU members.T Thus, the size of the home country relative to the
foreign economy, a, is set to 5 percent.8 The discount factor, B, equals 0.99 which implies
an annual real interest rate of around 4 percent. In line with the literature, the inverse
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption, o, is equal to 2. Following
Laxton and Pesenti (2003), the inverse of labor supply elasticity, ty', is set to 2.5. I assume
logarithmic utility of government consumption so that on: t.
The share of home tradable consumption in the tradable consumption basket, c,.r, and
the share of home intermediate good in production of final tradable goods, .y) are equal to
a. The share of tradable consumption in the consumption basket, rp, equals 55 percent as
in Natalucci and Ravenna (2003).
tThe model is calibrated to the EMU and the Czech Republic's data.
sThe new members' share of GDP in the EU total GDP is around 5 percent.
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The elasticity of substitution between non-tradable and tradable consumption, p, is set
to 0.5 as in Stockman and Tesar (1995) and the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign tradable good consumption, 4, is set to 1-.5. e is the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign intermediate goods and is set to 0.5. The last two parameters are
taken from Natalucci and Ravenna (2003). d denotes the elasticity of substitution among
intermediate goods. I set d : 6 which is standard in the literature and implies a markup of
l-.2.e The price adjustment cost parameter, K, is set to 77, as estimated by Ireland (2001)
for the US economy. All parameters for financial transaction costs are set to 0.01, which is
standard in the literature.
I first solve the model for historic fiscal and monetary policies. The steady state share of
the government purchases in GDP is calibrated to 18 percent. According to the data, fiscal
instruments follow an AR(l) process.l0 The monetary policy parameters for the EMU are
set as estimated by Smets and Wouters (2003). The degree of interest rate smoothing,,m6,
is set to 0.95. The interest rate response to inflation, m6p1, equals 1.65 and the interest
rate response to GDP, rrLGDpt is set to 0.14.
eMartins et al. (1996) estimate the average markup
countries. In the absence of an estimate for central and
estimate.
tos"" Chapter 1 for details on historic fiscal policies.
for manufacturing sector at L.2 for the OECD
Eastern European countries I use their markup
TL2
3.4 Transmission of shocks and dynamic properties of the
model
To understand how the model's transmission mechanism works, I first analyze impulse
responses of macroeconomic variables to the monetary shock. I also investigate the effects
of a fiscal shock in order to show how fiscal policy actions in one country affect the variables
in the other economv.
3.4.L Impulse responses to the monetary shock
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present impulse responses to a one-percent increase in the monetary
shockll which increases the nominal interest rate and the foreign real interest rate (which
is in units of foreign consumption basket). Consequently, the foreign private consumption
falls. The foreign country is relatively closedl2 so that dynamics of the foreign GDP follow
the dynamics of the foreign consumption. The foreign CPI inflation decreases. The fall in
the foreign consumption is due to a decrease in the foreign tradable consumption while the
foreign non-tradable consumption increases. A lower demand for the foreign tradable goods
reduces the production of the foreign final and intermediate tradable goods and a higher
demand for the non-tradable goods increases the production of these goods.
The real exchange rate appreciates in the foreign economy which looses competitiveness.
Since the home economy has significant trade linkages with the foreign economy, the spillover
llThe monetary shock is an iid shock.
12I only model trade linkages of the foreign economy with the small, home economy and abstract from the
rest of the world.
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effects are contractionary on home consumption and GDP. The effects of the monetary shock
are qualitatively similar in the home economy as they are in the foreign country. The real
interest rate (in units of home consumption basket) increases and the CPI inflation rate
decreases. The home households borrow from abroad.
3.4.2 Impulse responses to the foreign fiscal shock
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present impulse responses to a one-percent increase in foreign fiscal
shock. A demand shock in the form of an increase of foreign government purchases-to-GDP
ratio increases demand for labor and output in foreign non-tradable sector. Government
consumption crowds out private non-tradable consumption and this cushions foreign wage
rate and relative price of non-tradable goods from a large increase. Higher wages in the
non-tradable sector attract labor from the intermediate sector and thus the wage in the
intermediate sector increases as well. Consequently, supply of foreign intermediate goods
falls and demand adjusts. Because of the opposite dynamics of labor cost and markup
in foreign intermediate sector the relative price of foreign inputs almost does not change.
Intermediate goods are inputs in production of final tradable goods, which decreases in both
countries. In the foreign economy, the relative price of final tradable goods stays almost
the same. Foreign private consumption falls mainly due to the crowding out effect which
prevents foreign GDP from a significant expansion.
The shock transmits to the home economy because supply of foreign intermediate goods
drops and so does the production of home inputs. This reduces supply of home and foreign
final tradable goods. The relative price of home final tradable goods increases. Labor in
II4
the home country reallocates to the non-tradable sector because of lower labor demand and
wages in the intermediate sector. Higher labor supply in the non-tradable sector increases
production and reduces wages and relative prices in this sector. Overall home private
consumption decreases because consumption of final tradable goods is lower and almost
all of new non-tradable goods are consumed by the government which crowds out private
non-tradable consumption. Home GDP decrease.
Home CPI inflation decreases because the main components of home CPI inflation (home
prices of non-tradable goods and foreign prices of tradable goods) are lower. On the other
hand, foreign CPI does not change since all foreign prices stay almost constant. The real
exchange rate is thus driven by home prices and increases.
3.4.3 Estimates of macroeconomic variability
Previous section only analyzed the responses of variables in the two economies for a given
shock. When I an alyze the optimal policies
model in the presence of all shock. In order
and the need for fiscal cooperation, I simulate the
to do so, I need to make some assumptions about
stochastic processes. Empirical evidence on productivity shocks shows high persistence and
positive correlation across countries.l3 In my model, productivity shocks follow AR(1)
processes. I set persistence parameters of all productivity shocks to 0.9. Productivity
shocks between different sectors within a country are perfectly correlated as in Natalucci
and Ravenna (2003) and Laxton and Pesenti (2003). All other shocks are independent of
each other. The monetary shock is and iid process. Persistence parameters of preference
t3S"e for example Backus et al. (1992).
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shocks, labor disutility shocks and shocks to shifts in preferences between non-tradable and
tradable goods are set to 0.7, 0.9 and 0.9, respectively. I choose the standard deviations
of the shocks to match some of the moments of macroeconomic variables given historic
economic policies and baseline parameter values. The details on stochastic processes are in
Table 3.2.
Table 3.3 presents the second moments of selected macroeconomic variables. The model
generates almost twice as much variability in GDP in the new EU members compared
to the Euro Area and the absolute values of standard deviations are consistent with the
variability in the historic data. For the Czech Republic, the model performs well in the
sense that all of the GDP components are more volatile than GDP itself. However, the
government expenditure is more volatile in the model. The CPI inflation rate is more
volatile and the nominal interest rate is less volatile than in the data. This could be due
to the monetary regime that I assume for the smaller economy in the model. In order to
mimic current arrangement of the institutions in the new EU member states and to keep
the strategic games among policymakers as simple as possible, I assume that the smaller
economy supports a fixed exchange rate regime. However, historic moments are based on a
monetary regime that is not a fixed exchange rate regime.
For the Euro Area. the inflation and the interest rates are less variable in the model
because of the assumption of an inflation-targeting regime, which is similar to the model
properties of Laxton and Pesenti (2003). While data suggest less variability of the GDP
components than that of the GDP for the Euro Area, the model generates about the same
volatility for each of them.la
laA more detailed explanation of the model properties may be found in Chapter J.. However, keep in mind
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3.5 l)esign of fiscal and monetary policy
So far I have assumed that fiscal and monetary policies are conducted by use of historic
empirical rules. In this section I turn to the core question of my analysis: Are there
gains from fiscal cooperation in the EMU? Even though the new EU members do not yet
participate in the monetary union, they are expected to join it. Therefore, I assume that
the monetary union in my model consists of two different groups of countries; countries
such as the new EU members (Central and Eastern European countries) and countries that
currently constitute the EMU.
I assume that policymakers choose stabilization policy, i.e. reaction parameters in their
policy rules, to maximize the unconditional expectation of households' welfare and that
they can commit to the rules. Given the class of rules considered, such fiscal and monetary
policies are optimal.ls I use numeric optimization to solve for optimal policies. The welfare
function is derived as a second-order Taylor approximation to the utility function and can
be expressed in each period f as:16
(3.38)
where and G denote the steadv state values of consumption, labor and government
deviations from the steady state.purchases and hats denote percentage
The definitions of strategic games among the policymakers are as follows. Non-cooperative
game: Each government chooses its reaction parameter to GDP to maximize the uncondi-
that the model in this Chapter and the model in Chapter I are not the same.
15In what follows, optimal policy refers to optimal policy within the class of rules specified in the model.
16f assume that real monev balances do not matter for welfare as common in the literature.
Wt
e,7,,
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tional expectation of its households' welfare, taking the behavior of the other government
and the central bank as given. Taking the actions of the governments as given, the central
bank chooses the response parameters to inflation and GDP to maximize the unconditional
expectation of the joint welfare function which is defined as a weighted average of home
and foreign welfare and the weights correspond to the relative sizes of the two countries.
AII parameters are chosen simultaneously. Fiscal cooperation: The two governments act as
a "single" policymaker and each choose its response parameter to GDP to jointly maximize
the unconditional expectation of the joint welfare function, taking the behavior of the cen-
tral bank as given. The central bank again chooses parameters in its rule to maximize the
unconditional expectation of the joint welfare function. All policymakers act simultaneously.
3.5.1 Optimal fiscal and monetary policies and the desirability of fiscal
cooperation in the EMU
Table 3.1. shows the optimal feedback parameters and the associated welfare losses for the
cases of fiscal cooperation and the non-cooperative solution. In both cases, optimal policies
are countercyclical.
Table 3.1: Optimal Responses to Output and Inflation and the Associated Welfare Losses
f cop f&np mcpr mcnp L L*
No cooperation -2.L0
Cooperation -2.L3
-1.58 8.36
-2.45 2.67
17.083 1.382
17.083 L.364
28.9
9.20
Result 3.L Fi,scal polici,es are n"Lore aggressiue under fiscal cooperat'ion compared to the
no n- co o p erati,a e equili,b ri,um.
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Under fiscal cooperation the foreign government takes into account foreign as well as
home households' welfare. It is thus optimal that the foreign government pursues a more
active stabilization role and contributes to absorbing shocks that affect the home economy.
While there is a clear difference in foreign fiscal policy between the cooperative and the
non-cooperative solution, the home government does not change its policy by much. Since
the home economy is much smaller than the foreign economy, home fiscal policy almost
does not effect the foreign country's variables.
Result 3.2 The central bank's react'ion to i,nfl,ation and output is smaller under fiscal
cooperat'ion.
The importance of the central bank's inflation and output stabilization under fiscal co-
operation is reduced. This can be explained by analyzing some impulse responses.lT Cotr-
tractionary monetary policy triggers expansionary foreign fiscal policy and reduces foreign
consumption. This consumption reduction is magnified by the expansionary foreign fiscal
policy. Under fiscal cooperation, the foreign government reacts stronger to the monetary
actions and thus the indirect effect of foreign fiscal policy on foreign private consumption is
larger. But because the central bank chooses its policy parameters to maximizes the joint
welfare function (and the weight on foreign welfare in the joint welfare function is much
bigger that the weight on home welfare) and households dislike consumption variability, it
is optimal for the central bank not to respond as strongly to inflation and output as under
the non-cooperative fiscal game.18
17See Figure 3.5.
lssimilar conclusion can be made based on the home fiscal policy and the home private consumption.
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Result 3.3 Foreign households are better off in the cooperatiue equi,Iibrium and home
households are as well off under fi,scal cooperation as they are 'i,n the non-cooperati,ue equi-
libri,um.
In welfare terms home households are indifferent between fiscal cooperation and no fiscal
cooperation. Even though fiscal cooperation implies different fiscal and monetary policies
and different values of individual components of the utility function, home welfare is the
same under both cases. On the other hand, foreign households are better off when the
governments cooperate their fiscal policies. Foreign private and government consumption
are both less volatile under fiscal cooperation and dominate the effect of the more volatile
foreign labor effort.1e
This result differs from Pogorelec (2004) who shows in a similar model that fiscal coop-
eration is not desirable. There I assume that each country has a central bank and the two
monetary policies are set in a non-cooperative way. In this paper however, there is only one
monetary policy and when the two governments cooperate all the policymakers maximize a
weighted average of home and foreign welfare. In other words, they have the same objective.
Nonetheless, foreign household prefer fiscal cooperation and home households are indifferent
between the two equilibria. This result differs from Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003) and
Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002) who show that there is no need for fiscal cooperation in
a monetary union when all the players agree on their goals. However, the result is similar
to Lombardo and Sutherland (2003) who conclude that fiscal cooperation is beneficial in a
monetary union (or when monetary policies are set cooperatively).
19RecallthatgovernmentconSumptionisendogenouS,G,-ffi
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3.6 Conclusions
The new EU members will have to join the monetary union in the near future. I thus
analyze whether there are welfare gains from fiscal cooperation in a moneta.ry union which
consists of the new (future) members and the incumbent EMU countries. I find that there
are welfare gains from fiscal cooperation for the incumbent members and the new members
are as well off under fiscal cooperation as in the non-cooperative solution. However, I do
not quantiS' the gains and I also do not model the costs associated with implementing and
supporting fiscal cooperation. I leave these issues for future research.
L2T
Appendix to Chapter 3
Foreign household j*'s budget constraint is:
rwi. + a;ii * ,;*(#)' * I,' u;" sfi1ia,. * lo" u; si;l*,a* +
< milr+ (1+ i,)n;,i- * l"' (ni. *rf-) sl)r,i. d,*+
wfu,rLti,r+wi,ril*,, 
- 
p;r!- + p;rcTi- * 
Io" @f +uf) si,:{- d,r.
P;CT-
(A3-1)
As opposed to home households, foreign consumers buy and trade shares in home and
foreign intermediate sector firms. B* denotes bonds held by foreign consumers, 53, are
shares in foreign firm r* held by a foreign consumer entering period t and Sf,r are shares
in home firm r held by a foreign consumer entering period t. The price of shares of foreign
firm r* is denoted by Vf. and the price of shares of home firm r is denoted bV Uf . Foreign
households receive dividends on foreign and home shares, Df- and Df, respectively.
r22
Table 3.2: Assumptions About Stochastic Processes
Standard Deviation
Home Foreign
Persistence Parameter
Home Foreign
Productivity
Marginal Utility of Consumption
Marginal Disutility of Labor
Preference Shifter
Government/GDP
Interest Rate
0.0200 0.0087
0.0387 0.0224
0.0100 0.0032
0.0089 0.0032
0.0032 0.0010
0.0032
0.9
0.7
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.7
0.9
0.9
0.9
r23
Table 3.3: Macroeconomic Variabilitv of the Czech Republic and the Euro Area
Czech Republic Euro Area
Model Historic Model Historic
Standard deviation (itr %)
Real GDP
Consumption
Government Expenditure
CPI Inflation
Short-Term Interest Rate
Employment
Real Exchange Rate
1.98
2.68
5.89
2.44
0.36
0.91
3.22
2.0*
2.29
2.6*
1.08
0.47
3.1
1.00
1.01
T.T2
0.30
0.36
0.64
1.0*
0.9*
0.6*
0.56
0.98
1.16
Note: The model's variables are detrended with HP filter. Estimates of historic standard
deviations that are taken from Laxton and Pesenti (2003) are marked by a star. The rest
of estimates for the Czech Republic are taken from Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) and for
the Euro Area they are taken from Fagan et al. (2001). Data in Laxton and Pesenti (2003)
are detrended with HP filter using the smoothness parameter of 1600. The time period for
the Euro Area data is from 1970Q1 to 2002Q4 and for the Czech Republic from 1973Q1
to 2002Q4. In Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) all series are logged (except for interest and
inflation rates) and HP filtered. Data are per capita and seasonally adjusted. Time span
for the Czech Republic is 1994Q1 to 2003Q1. In Fagan et al. (forthcoming), variables are
expressed in per capita terms and logged (except for inflation and interest rates). They are
seasonally adjusted and HP filtered.
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Figure 3.1-: Impulse Responses of Foreign Variables to Monetary Shock
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Responses of Home Variables to Monetary Shock
CPI inflation
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5 010203040I(I'
*o 
^ 
Final tradable consumption
evrE(u
o
o -0.2
E
o
c 'o'4o
(u
'E 
-ou
o
Oi6, Ig 
-0.8c010203040og
O r-:--r.r,-^.r^r-r^ ^--l---^
010203040 0 10 20 30
", 
.Final non{radable consumption
v. I 0.s ,r!ce of final tradable
-0.05
I
i
-0.1 i
I
I
-0.15 i
I
i
l
-o 2l
I
I
I
-o.25 .
0.8
0.6
o.4
o.2
0
-o.2
40
oods
0.05 i
,
0"\
t\
-0.05 I
-0.1 ,
0
0.4 ,
;
o.2-
I
0:
i
-o.2: Itl
)
-0.4 |
0
10 20 30
Intermediate output
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1400
Quarters
0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
-1
d Final tradable output0.1
0102030
Non-tradable output
10 20
Bonds
-0.5 r--
l
i\
l10
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
I
I
-1 |
I
I
i
'
-1.5 r
I
I
i
i
-21-010
Consumption Real interest rate
I
I
I
I
I
t
L26
Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses of Foreign Variables to Foreign Fiscal Shock
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses of Home Variables to Foreign Fiscal Shock
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Figure 3.5: Explaining Why Monetary Policy is Looser Under Fiscal Cooperation
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